

IMPLICATIONS OF A RESURGENT RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
FOR US EUROPEAN COMMAND

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Joint Planning Studies

by

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## ABSTRACT

IMPLICATIONS OF A RESURGENT RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR U.S.  
EUROPEAN COMMAND, by Matthew Dawson, 122 pages.

This thesis explores the Russian Federation's resurgence as a center of influence and the implications of this resurgence for United States European Command. This is accomplished by examining three countries within European Command's area of responsibility as case studies to determine Russian and U.S. interests, the convergence and divergence of those interests, and ultimately the implications for European Command. This study is based on the hypothesis that the Russian Federation's resurgence impacts European Command's activities by forcing European Command to strike a balance between cultivating Russia as a strategic partner on security cooperation issues and preparing to defend US allies against Russian aggression.

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## ACRONYMS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (instruments of national power)
FSU	Former Soviet Union
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UN	United Nations
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

In the 15th century the Principality of Muscovy emerged from two centuries of Mongol rule and began conquering neighboring territories. This expansion continued after the Romanov Dynasty emerged in the 16th century. Peter I expanded Russian territory to the Baltic Sea and created the Russian Empire. The great losses of the Russian Army during World War I led to the overthrow of the Russian monarchy in 1917. Soon thereafter, the communists seized power under Vladimir Lenin and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formed. From 1928 to 1953 Iosef Stalin strengthened communist rule and Russian domination of the USSR. Mikail Gorbachev's attempts to modernize the communist system in the USSR from 1985 to 1991 inadvertently led to the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991; resulting in the independence of Russia and 14 other former Soviet countries.<sup>1</sup> As this study will demonstrate, Russia has taken diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) actions to reassert itself as a center of influence amongst Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries and former Warsaw Pact countries.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed in 1991 by 11 of the 15 countries from the FSU. The CIS was seen largely as a vehicle through which Russia could preserve influence over satellite countries. These satellite countries, though not blind to Russia's vision for the CIS, participated in the CIS to retain access to Russia's

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<sup>1</sup>The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html> (accessed 13 January 2011).

valuable markets. The CIS has not lived up to Russia's vision, however it is clear that Russia was interested in retaining or regaining influence over its neighbors from the FSU.<sup>2</sup>

Today, Russia is an energy behemoth. Russia globally ranks first in oil production, second in oil exports, first in proven natural gas reserves, first in natural gas export, and second in natural gas production.<sup>3</sup> This study will demonstrate how Russia is leveraging its natural resources, along with other resources, to strengthen its influence in Estonia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and Georgia. These countries, along with Russia, all fall within the United States European Command's (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR)

USEUCOM was created in 1952 to provide unified command and authority over all US military forces in Europe. Unified Command over US forces was successfully applied during World War II and, "called for a single commander, responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by a joint staff, and exercising command over all the units of his assigned force, regardless of service."<sup>4</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed this type of command structure could be valuable after the war, and on June 28, 1945 issued a directive appointing General Dwight Eisenhower as Commanding General, US Forces, European Theater (CGUSFET).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>MAJ Andrea L. Hlosek, USAF, "The Mechanics of Russian Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia—Regional Hegemony or Neo-Imperialism?" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006).

<sup>3</sup>CIA World Factbook.

<sup>4</sup>Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb. *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003), 11.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

The Outline Command Plan, which was essentially the first Unified Command Plan, established a global system of unified command for US forces under JCS control. The Outline Command Plan was approved by President Truman on 14 December 1946 and called for the eventual establishment of “European Command” as one of the seven original unified commands.<sup>6</sup> The original area of responsibility and mission of European Command were, “All forces allocated to the European Theater by the JCS or other authority. Commander-in-Chief, Europe would occupy Germany, support the national policy in Europe \_within the scope of his command responsibility,‘ and plan and prepare for general emergency.”<sup>7</sup> The JCS retained responsibility for the USSR, considering it a “worldwide problem.”<sup>8</sup>

Today, the official mission of USEUCOM, “is to conduct military operations, international military partnering, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United States forward . . . by establishing an agile security organization able to conduct full spectrum activities as part of whole of government solutions to secure enduring stability in Europe and Eurasia.”<sup>9</sup> Russia was not a responsibility of USEUCOM until changes to the UCP in 2002. The 2002 UCP changes also assigned US Pacific Command to assist USEUCOM with the far-eastern portion of

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 12.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 71.

<sup>9</sup>United States European Command (USEUCOM), “A Brief History,” <http://www.eucom.mil/english/history.asp> (accessed 31 January 2011).

the Russian Federation.<sup>10</sup> USEUCOM's current AOR includes 51 countries, including Russia and the other FSU countries, with the exception of Central Asian states.<sup>11</sup>

The Russian Federation's position as a center of influence is the subject of this study. The primary research question is: Does a resurgent Russian Federation impact USEUCOM activities?

This primary research question leads to secondary questions such as: what, if any, is the impact a resurgent Russian Federation has on USEUCOM activities?; what indicators exist that demonstrate the Russian Federation is a center of influence?; what has driven the Russian Federation's successful reemergence as a center of influence; was the Russian Federation's role as a center of influence ever truly diminished?; does the Russian Federation have the power and resources to sustain itself as a center of influence?; what is the Russian Federation's sphere of influence? The primary and secondary research questions are illustrated in figure 1.

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<sup>10</sup>GlobalSecurity.org, "U.S. European Command," [www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/eucom.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/eucom.htm) (accessed 11 April 2008).

<sup>11</sup>USEUCOM, "A Brief History."




Figure 1. Primary and Secondary Research Questions

*Source:* Created by author.

The hypothesis for this study is that the Russian Federation's resurgence impacts USEUCOM activities by forcing USEUCOM to strike a balance between cultivating Russia as a strategic partner on security cooperation issues and preparing to defend US allies against Russian aggression.

Within the USEUCOM AOR, Russia has reasserted- and continues to reassert- itself within its perceived sphere of influence through the use of effective DIME instruments of national power. Russia's actions to solidify its sphere of influence may be viewed as confrontational by affected US allies. There is cause for concern and hope for cautious optimism from a USEUCOM perspective regarding Russian actions to

consolidate its sphere of influence. This is examined further in chapter 4. A resurgent Russian Federation is the independent variable for this study. The impact on USEUCOM activities is the dependent variable..

This study assumes that the power, resources, actions and intentions of the Russian Federation can provide a measure of its influence regionally and internationally. This study also assumes that the Russian governmental system will remain stable and that Russia will be a prominent actor in the international arena for the near future because of its DIME resources and power.

A key term used throughout this study is “center of influence.” For the purposes of this study, the term “center of influence” is defined as a geopolitical entity that dominates political and economic influence within a geographic area or amongst multiple geopolitical entities comprising a sphere of influence (author’s definition). More terms are provided in this study’s glossary to provide maximum clarity for the reader.

The study concentrates on the present and future position of the Russian Federation as a center of influence in the USEUCOM AOR and its affects on USEUCOM activities. Though this study briefly describes the history of the Russian Federation’s influence, it will do so in order to define the Russian Federation’s current standing in the international arena. This study is also delimited to exploring the Russian Federation’s actions and influences in the USEUCOM AOR since the dissolution of the USSR. Russia has a far-reaching foreign policy, however this study is focused on the implications a resurgent Russian Federation has on USEUCOM. This study will be kept unclassified and only use unclassified source materials.

This study is significant because it provides an in-depth analysis of the future of the Russian Federation as a potential partner and/or adversary to the United States. In an era of persistent conflict focused largely on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, it is important to remain vigilant of conventional powers. As the U.S. military continues to evolve to be able to address both state and non-state adversaries in the future, studies such as this will be important to define how the force of the future might look, especially from the perspective of USEUCOM. This study will also be useful in identifying what diplomatic, economic, and informational strategies might be available to leverage the Russian Federation as a potential partner or adversary.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Sufficient literature exists to study the Russian Federation's position as a center of influence and its impacts on USEUCOM. This study relies on a balanced mix of public and private sector documents from throughout the world to address the primary and secondary research questions. Policy guidance exists that documents the desired US national and strategic relationship with the Russian Federation. Also available is a plethora of literature examining the Russian Federation's sphere of influence and foreign policy objectives. Journals such as *Foreign Affairs*, among others, have an extensive collection of articles that are relevant to this study. In addition, there are substantial and reliable online resources relevant to this study. Some key sources on which this study relies are publicly available US and Russian policy documents and Master's Theses from US military postgraduate schools that provide valuable information demonstrating Russia's resurgence as a center of influence. These and other sources are described below.

The *2010 US National Security Strategy (NSS)*, which mentions Russia no less than 13 times, clearly recognizes that Russia is a geopolitical center of influence. The *2010 NSS* states, —~~W~~are working to build deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence—including China, India, and Russia . . . so that we can cooperate on issues of bilateral and global concern.” The *NSS* also provides that, —~~While~~ actively seeking Russia's cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia,



[the US] will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors."<sup>12</sup>

These statements suggest that while the United States recognizes the reemergence of Russia, it is not necessarily a positive element for US foreign policy, and even has the potential for negative implications.

As recently as 7 September 2010, an article entitled "Changing Course in Moscow; Is Medvedev Serious about a New Vision for Russian Foreign Policy" was published in *Foreign Affairs*. This article provides useful material for this study and demonstrates the currency of the proposed research question. This article takes recent economic and geopolitical events (i.e. the global economic downturn and the impacts of Russia's military actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia) into account and sets the conditions for Russia to play the part of either a US strategic partner or adversary. In this article, Jeffrey Mankoff contends that "the resurgence of Russian power in opposition to the United States and the European Union reached its apex with the August 2008 war in Georgia."<sup>13</sup> The significance of this war on Russia's resurgence to power is explored further in chapter 4. Mankoff asserts that now the future of Russia's position in US foreign policy depends on who is leading the Russian Federation, the status of natural resource export prices, and Russia's ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO). These variables allow this study to explore the primary research question and secondary research questions. According to Mankoff, Russia's future is tied economically to the US

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<sup>12</sup>The White House, *2010 National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\\_viewer/national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf) (accessed 23 May 2011).

<sup>13</sup>Jeffrey Mankoff, "Changing Course in Moscow; Is Medvedev Serious About a New Vision for Russian Foreign Policy?," *Foreign Affairs* (7 September 2010).

and European Union (EU), and therefore is better positioned to act a strategic partner to the US and EU.<sup>14</sup>

Gregory Feifer and Brian Whitmore contend in “Czech Power Games: How Russia is Rebuilding Influence in the Former Soviet Bloc,” that Russia’s resurgence continues to grow, despite the global economic downturn.<sup>15</sup> Written in September 2010, this article presents the Czech Republic as an example of Russia’s resurgence and successful gains in reestablishing its sphere of influence over former Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries. This article takes into account the fact that, though its economy might not be growing as fast as it was before the global economic downturn, Russia remains the world’s largest energy exporter. Central and Eastern European countries remain highly dependent on Russian for oil and gas supplies.<sup>16</sup> Russia has shown a willingness to use its position as a major supplier of critical resources to Europe as a foreign policy tool, as demonstrated by cutting natural gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006.<sup>17</sup> Feifer and Whitmore remind the reader that this was a punitive move by Moscow for Ukraine’s pro-Western foreign policy. For countries that wish to seek energy independence and self-sufficiency, Russia is marketing its nuclear technology as an answer. The Czech Republic looks to

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Gregory Feifer and Brian Whitmore, “Czech Power Games: How Russia is Rebuilding Influence in the Former Soviet Bloc,” *Radio Free Europe*, [http://www.rferl.org/content/Czech\\_Mate\\_How\\_Russia\\_Is\\_Rebuilding\\_Influence\\_In\\_The\\_Former\\_Soviet\\_Bloc/2168090.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Czech_Mate_How_Russia_Is_Rebuilding_Influence_In_The_Former_Soviet_Bloc/2168090.html) (accessed 25 September 2010).

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

sign the biggest energy deal in its history with a Russian company<sup>18</sup> The authors present the Czech Republic as a showcase example of how Russia is leveraging its energy exports and economic ties to deepen ties and even indirectly control former Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries to reestablish its sphere of influence, despite recent global economic and geopolitical events.

The *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010*, published by US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), takes a notably pessimistic stance on US-Russian relations. *JOE 2010* presents Russia as a country striving to retain and enhance its great power status.<sup>19</sup> With its immense natural resource reserves, Russia could repair its dilapidated infrastructure and invest in improving the welfare of the Russian people. Instead, Russia has chosen to ~~maximize~~ maximize petroleum revenues without making the investments in oil fields that would increase oil and gas production over the long term.”<sup>20</sup>

*JOE 2010* portrays Russia as a country with reason to be xenophobic. Russia has on its international borders unstable, newly oil rich countries in central Asia, separatists in the Caucasus, and a rapidly growing China.<sup>21</sup> Specific to the USEUCOM AOR, *JOE 2010* asserts —Russia is playing a more active but less constructive role across the Black Sea, Caucasus, and Baltic regions. Russian involvement in each of these areas has its own character, but they have in common a Russia that is inserting itself into the affairs of its

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>US Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010* (Suffolk, VA: US Joint Forces Command, February 2010).

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

much-smaller neighbors. In each, Russia plays on ethnic and national tension to extend its influence in its \_near abroad.”<sup>22</sup> *JOE 2010* goes on to assert Russia is providing direct support to separatists in the Caucasus region and indirect support to sustain conflicts such as the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Overall, *JOE 2010* portrays Russia as a catalyst for conflict in USEUCOM’s AOR.

Major Andrea Hlosek, USAF, published a Master’s thesis in 2006 that explored the nature of Russia’s resurgence. Major Hlosek’s thesis investigates the nature behind Russia’s attempts to reassert its sphere of influence amongst former Soviet states by conducting case studies of the Republic of Georgia and countries within Central Asia, e.g. Uzbekistan. Though Major Hlosek’s thesis was published in 2006- prior to the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia- it nonetheless provides valuable information regarding precursors to the conflict in Georgia and Russia’s diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) levers in Georgia and other states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Hlosek’s thesis documents Russia’s re-emergence as a center of influence through both hard and soft power tactics; however it does not explore the impact of Russia’s resurgence on USEUCOM.<sup>23</sup>

Major Mariusz Nogaj of the Polish Ministry of Defense published a thesis in 2008 for the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School exploring Russia’s resurgence through a case study analysis. Major Nogaj’s hypothesis was that, –Russia’s aspiration is to challenge

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Hlosek.

U.S. domination once again.”<sup>24</sup> Major Nogaj provides an excellent description of Russian interests in its near abroad and its efforts to strengthen its sphere of influence. He does this through a case-study analysis of Georgia, Ukraine, and Poland. His analysis will be key to this study’s analysis of Russian interests in the USEUCOM AOR and Russian DIME actions in Ukraine and Georgia.

The latest version of “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” developed by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and approved by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008, provides much insight into the role the Russian Federation sees herself playing on the world stage and the Russian vision for US-Russian relations. Russia’s foreign policy concept is “a system of views on the content, principles and main areas of the foreign policy activities of Russia.”<sup>25</sup> The Foreign Policy Concept asserts that Russia is a nation on the rise, with an “increased role of the country in international affairs, its responsibility for global developments and related possibilities to participate in the implementation of the international agenda.”<sup>26</sup> The Foreign Policy Concept makes clear that Russia sees itself as a center of influence with a large sphere of influence. Included within the first among foreign policy objectives listed is “to achieve

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<sup>24</sup>Major Miusz Nogaj, Polish Ministry of Defense, “Russia-A New Empire Under Construction: The Russian Policy Against Former Communist Satellites-Mechanisms of Exertion of Influence” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008), 47.

<sup>25</sup>Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” (unofficial translation), 12 July 2008, <http://www.mid.ru/> (accessed 30 March 2011).

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

strong positions of authority in the world community that best meet the interests of the Russian Federation as one of the influential centers in the modern world.”<sup>27</sup>

One of the main tenets of the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation is the strengthening of the United Nations (UN), and especially the UN Security Council. Russia is concerned that the UN has lost control influence in the international arena. The document overtly condemns the expansion of NATO and specifically any plans to admit Georgia and Ukraine to the alliance. With regard to the US specifically, the concept takes a notably positive approach to potential future bilateral relations with the United States. However, the document makes clear Russia is concerned about the US acting unilaterally and without regard to the UN Charter.<sup>28</sup>

The disparity in opinions regarding the future of Russia’s position as a center of influence begs the question; how does USEUCOM view the Russian Federation? The USEUCOM 2010 posture statement devotes much attention to Russia. Reflecting the 2010 US National Security Strategy, the USEUCOM posture statement takes a balanced approach, recognizing Russia as a potential partner and as a potential source of conflict in the USEUCOM area of responsibility.<sup>29</sup> In his testimony before the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, USEUCOM Commander Admiral James Stavridis mentions the US Naval Forces Europe participation in exercise FRUKUS 2009, a confidence-building exercise between the US, France, United Kingdom that, ~~focused~~ on resuming the maritime partnerships between

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>James G Stavridis, “US European Command (USEUCOM) Posture Statement, Testimony to 111th Congress” (Washington, DC, 9 March 2010).

NATO's major Navies and the Russian Federation Navy.”<sup>30</sup> However, Stavridis later delicately mentions Russia as a challenging element for USEUCOM planning and a potential source of conflict, especially in the Caucasus region.

Vincent Pouliot asserts a balanced optimism for the future of Russian-US relations in his 2007 article, “Pacification without Collective Identification: Russian and the Transatlantic Community in the Post-Cold War Era.”<sup>31</sup> This article focuses mostly on the Russian relationship with the transatlantic security community (TSC) and whether a sense of collective identity is needed to establish a security community. However, much is directly stated and much can be inferred regarding the Russian-US relationship. Pouliot presents five distinct indicators of a passive security community and the corresponding scores of the Russian-TSC relationship. These sectors and corresponding scores are illustrated in figure 2. Pouliot provides detailed and sound justification for the scores provided. Pouliot asserts that, given the medium to low scores presented, a nascent Russian-Atlantic security community has emerged in the last two decades.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 23.

<sup>31</sup>Vincent Pouliot, “Pacification without Collective Identification: Russian and the Transatlantic Community in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 5 (September 2007): 505-622.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 609.

Table 1. Indicators of a Russian-Atlantic Security Community, 2006		
<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Scores</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Multilateralism	Medium	Many new forums created with some tangible results; but the process is still fragile and unequal
Unfortified borders	Low to medium	Significant demilitarization; yet military inertia sometimes perpetuates confrontational thinking
Changes in military planning	Low to medium	Revised military doctrines downplay the possibility of mutual confrontation; joint exercises/operations
Common definition of threat	Medium	Convergence in terms of threat perceptions but lingering disagreements about the use of force
Discourse of community	Medium	Community discourse at international level clashes with a sometimes bickering language domestically

Figure 2. Indicators of a Russian-Atlantic Security Community

Source: Vincent Pouliot, "Pacification without Collective Identification: Russian and the Transatlantic Community in the Post-Cold War Era," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 5 (September 2007): 505-622.

Mark Kramer presents valuable context to the evolution of several FSU states and their respective relationships with Russia and the West since the breakup of the Soviet Union in his article, "NATO, the Baltic States, and Russia: A Framework for Sustainable Enlargement."<sup>33</sup> The context provided goes beyond the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) for the purposes of this thesis, and includes historical reference for Ukraine and the Czech Republic. Kramer's article provides context to Russian and US interests in these states from the breakup of the Soviet Union to October 2002. He also outlines some of the DIME actions Russia took to preserve influence in several FSU states (including Georgia, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine) immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

<sup>33</sup>Mark Kramer, "NATO, the Baltic States, and Russia: A Framework for Sustainable Enlargement," *International Affairs* (The Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1944) 78, no. 4 (October 2002): 731-756.



To identify the impact Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) issues have on U.S. Russian relations- and ultimately on USEUCOM planning- this study uses as a key source Richard Weitz's 2010 article, "Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO, and Missile Defence."<sup>34</sup> Weitz's article provides valuable background and analysis on efforts by NATO and the US to build BMD sites in central Europe. The article provides a concise history of the issue, beginning with President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative through current events, including President Obama's Phased Adaptive Approach Strategy. Weitz presents the issue respectively from Russian, NATO, and US perspectives. Czech Republic and Polish perspectives on NATO, US, or joint Russian-NATO BMD sites are also presented. This document provides a solid foundation for this study's analysis of BMD issues impacting U.S.-Russian relations.

Resources focusing on the U.S.-NATO-Russia BMD issue abound. These articles provide a range of opinions on the prospects for partnership and collaboration on BMD. One such article is Craig Whitlock's March 2011 *Washington Post* article, "Russia, U.S. warm up on missile defense."<sup>35</sup> Though this thesis will not base much analysis on newspaper articles, this particular article presents some facts from the U.S. and Russian defense perspectives regarding the potential for future partnership on BMD-related articles. These facts support an argument for cautious optimism for future BMD-related issues.

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<sup>34</sup>Richard Weitz, "Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO, and Missile Defence," *Survival*, 52: 4, 99-120.

<sup>35</sup>Craig Whitlock, "Russia, U.S. warm up on missile defense," *The Washington Post*, 21 March 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-ua-warm-up-on-missile-defense> (accessed 15 May 2011).

In conducting an analysis of the Obama administration's 'Reset Policy' with Russia, Stephen Blank provides balance to optimism regarding U.S.-Russian relations in his article entitled "Beyond the Reset Policy: Current Dilemmas of U.S.-Russian Relations."<sup>36</sup> Blank contends that any hope the U.S. has for a strategic partnership with Russia means caving to Russian demands regarding the establishment of BMD sites and accepting a Russian sphere of influence among CIS and FSU states.<sup>37</sup> Blank presents Russia as perceiving a genuinely adversarial relationship with the U.S. and NATO- especially with regard to BMD- despite probably realizing neither the U.S. nor NATO present an offensive threat. In this article, Blank indeed goes beyond U.S.-Russian relations within the confines of the reset policy and explores a broader strategic landscape characterized by Russia's doctrinal first-use employment of tactical nuclear weapons, even in otherwise conventional conflicts. Among Russia's intention for the future use of tactical nuclear weapons is the demarcation of a Russian sphere of influence throughout its near abroad.<sup>38</sup> Blank's article is used for the purposes of this study to portray Russia's use, and threat of use, of military instruments of national power to broaden and solidify its sphere of influence and to analyze the impact this has on USEUCOM planning.

Colonel Richard Anderson, US Army, provides an overview and analysis of Russia's natural gas industry, and the leverage it provides Russia in dealing with other countries, in his paper, "Europe's Dependence on Russian Natural Gas: Perspectives and

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<sup>36</sup>Stephen Blank, "Beyond the Reset Policy: Current Dilemmas of U.S. – Russian Relations," *Comparative Strategy* 29 (October 2010): 333-367.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 334.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 351.

Recommendations for a Long-Term Strategy.”<sup>39</sup> COL Anderson’s main thesis is that the European Union should diversify its energy needs away from an unreliable Russian producer. Anderson looks at the Russian natural gas industry from the perspectives of Russia as a producer and exporter, as well as from the EU and CIS as consumers. COL Anderson provides a breakdown of reliance on Russian natural gas by country; including Ukraine and the Czech Republic. This article illustrates that Europe is more dependent on Russia for natural gas than for oil, and therefore natural gas is the energy Russia uses as leverage against European countries. Specifically; this article uses Ukraine as an example of Russia’s reliance on natural gas as an instrument of national power and influence. This article helps answer the question of Russia’s ability to sustain itself as a center of influence, since much is riding on its natural resources infrastructure. COL Anderson portrays Russia as an unreliable provider of natural gas for European countries, and provides recommendations on how these states can diversify their energy needs away from reliance on Russia. Whether these recommendations are plausible or not; this article is used by this study to portray Russia’s use of energy as an instrument of national power and influence.

Jane’s Sentinel provides security and risk assessments for Ukraine, Georgia, and Czech Republic. Jane’s provides background information for each state such as history, a foreign policy overview, and information regarding relations with the U.S. and Russia.

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<sup>39</sup>Richard J Anderson, *Europe’s Dependence on Russian Natural Gas: Perspectives and Recommendations for a Long-term Strategy*, George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies Occasional Papers, No 19, September 2008, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA488295&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed 31 January 2011).

These Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments will provide integral information for this study's case study analyses.<sup>40</sup>

The CIA World Factbook<sup>41</sup> and the US Department of State Country Background Notes<sup>42</sup> websites provide valuable factual information for the countries studied in this thesis. As outlined in chapter 3, this thesis uses several countries from within the USEUCOM AOR to conduct case study-based research to answer this study's primary and secondary research questions. Both the CIA World Factbook and the US Department of State Background Notes websites provide valuable information regarding the economies, infrastructures, political systems, and international relationships for all the countries researched in this study. This information is used to analyze the impact a resurgent Russia has on USEUCOM planning efforts.

An in-depth description of the research methodology used to satisfy the primary and secondary research questions of this thesis is provided in chapter 3. This thesis uses a case-study based research methodology. This research methodology uses data from multiple resources that provide valuable information and recommendations for successfully conducting case-study based research. A combination of work presented by John Gerring, Jason Seawright, Rose McDermott, and Khairul Baharein Mohd Noor is

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<sup>40</sup>IHS Global Limited, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*, May 2010.

<sup>41</sup>Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *The World Factbook*, September 2010, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html> (accessed 21 May 2011).

<sup>42</sup>The United States Department of State, "Background Notes," <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn> (accessed 30 April 2011).

used to typify, describe, and conduct this thesis' research methodology. These resources are described in much greater detail in chapter 3.

The literature review for this study presents a broad array of opinions and statements from the public and private sector regarding Russia's position as a center of influence, its ability to sustain itself as a center of influence, and the impacts this has on US national interests. The literature reviewed trends toward a very cautiously optimistic future for US-Russian relations. What is lacking is detailed analysis on the impacts of a resurgent Russia on USEUCOM. Also missing is a detailed definition of a "center of influence," as it pertains to international relations. This study attempts to fill these voids through a case study based research methodology.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study analyzes Russia's resurgence in the USEUCOM AOR by analyzing Russian and US interests and actions in the area through a multiple case study methodology using standard analysis criteria. Intensive analytic review of existing literature will form the basis of research for this thesis. As mentioned in Chapter 2 and demonstrated in the bibliography, an abundance of literature is available that is relevant to examining the Russian Federation's position as a center of influence and its impacts on US foreign policy and influence within USEUCOM's area of responsibility (AOR).

This study examines some of the available research to assess Russia's position as a center of influence and identify Russia's probability of becoming a partner or adversary of the United States. By using the primary research question and secondary research questions as a guide, a qualitative analysis will be conducted using data from this literature to form a conclusion on the impact a resurgent Russian Federation has on USEUCOM.

This study provides an analysis of Russian interests by examining its actions in the USEUCOM AOR since the dissolution of the USSR. A similar analysis of US interests and actions in the area is also conducted. This study then examines a series of case studies that together will provide a cross-sampling of Russia's behavior and perceived influence within USEUCOM's AOR.

This study will examine Russia's actions in, and relations with, the Republic of Georgia, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. Two of these states are of the FSU, while the Czech Republic is a former member of the Warsaw Pact. Each case study will illuminate

Russia's DIME actions, US interests, how these interests and actions converge or diverge, and the impact this has on USEUCOM. A cross-case analysis will be used to develop a conclusion on Russia's position as either a strategic partner or adversary in USEUCOM's AOR. This study will follow the methodology illustrated in figure 3 for case study analysis.<sup>43</sup>




Figure 3. Steps in conducting case study research

Source: Khairul Baharein Mohd Noor, "Case Study: A Strategic Research Methodology," *American Journal of Applied Sciences* 5, no. 11 (2008): 1603.

Case-study based research is a valid methodology for conducting this thesis. A case study is defined as, "the intensive (qualitative or quantitative) analysis of a unit or

<sup>43</sup>Khairul Baharein Mohd Noor, "Case Study: A Strategic Research Methodology," *American Journal of Applied Sciences* 5, no. 11 (2008): 1603.

small number of units (the cases) where the researcher's goal is to understand a larger class of similar units (a population of cases)."<sup>44</sup> Using nation-states as the units of analysis for research is a valid and viable design methodology. Units for case study research are valid so long as they are ~~re~~relatively well-bounded and as long as these units lie at the same level of analysis as the principle inference."<sup>45</sup>

There are several advantages to using case study research methodology in social-science oriented studies such as this one, though some in academia have criticized the use of case study research as leaving too much open to generalization. Case study research allows a researcher to obtain a holistic perspective of socially-based phenomena or series of events when several divergent sources are examined as part of the research. Conducting case study research also allows a researcher to observe emergent changes and demonstrated patterns in organizational behavior.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, conducting several case studies in the course of a research project can provide scientific value and reduce generalization. To establish scientific value, several case studies should be applied to a standard examination (e.g. identical research questions) to produce replicating results. Conclusions in case study based research are more valid if such replication is observed in several case studies.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (June 2008): 296.

<sup>45</sup>John Gerring and Rose McDermott, "An Experimental Template for Case Study Research," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 3 (July 2007): 688.

<sup>46</sup>Noor, 1602-1604.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*



John Gerring has written extensively to improve the credibility and quality of case study research. Gerring and other political scientists have developed a broad lexicon describing the aspects of case study research. Gerring and Jason Seawright contribute further to this lexicon and also describe purposive techniques for selecting cases when conducting quantitative and- more germane to this thesis- qualitative case study research in their article entitled, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options.”<sup>48</sup>

Gerring and Seawright open the article by presenting the importance of methodological selection when conducting case study research. Random sampling is not a viable case selection methodology when one is examining a small number of cases.<sup>49</sup> One must also be careful to avoid sample bias to ensure the integrity of a study’s findings. Although purposive selection does not eliminate generalization, it does allow a researcher to select the cases most appropriate for a given qualitative or quantitative study.<sup>50</sup>

This thesis researches three case studies independently (Georgia, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic), but with common research questions. These cases were purposively selected. These cases have the common features as being FSU countries or having been directly within the USSR’s sphere of influence (e.g. Czech Republic as a former Warsaw Pact member), currently being sovereign international states, and also as being currently

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<sup>48</sup>Seawright and Gerring, 296.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

within USEUCOM's AOR. These cases were also selected because they represent an accurate cross section of USEUCOM's AOR.

A resurgent Russian Federation is the independent variable for this study. The impact on USEUCOM activities is the dependent variable. Each case study is presumed to demonstrate two external influences; the first being the DIME actions Russia is taking to increase its influence within the respective case, and the second being the impact of these actions and Russia's resurgent influence have on USEUCOM.

The objective of these case studies is to produce replicating results in terms of Russia's resurgent influence and divergent results in terms how Russia is achieving this influence, i.e. using different elements of DIME. The purposive selection of several cases examined using identical research questions to produce anticipated replicating results will diminish any generalization of this thesis' findings and enhance its validity and scientific value.

Gerring and Seawright identify seven types of cases available for purposive case study research: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, most similar, and most different.<sup>51</sup> The cases studied in this thesis contain characteristics of several of Gerring's and Seawright's types. The cases examined in this study can be most appropriately typified as diverse, as the case selection strategy is to —achieve maximum variance along relevant dimensions.”<sup>52</sup> The cases selected for this study have several common variables that provide relevant dimensions. Each case has the common features of being FSU countries or having been directly within the USSR's sphere of influence, currently being

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<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Gerring and McDermott, 299.

sovereign international states, and also as being currently within USEUCOM's AOR. They also provide maximum variance in the different DIME instruments of national power Russia has employed in each.

John Gerring and Rose McDermott address the scientific validity of case study research and present a model for scientifically ‘experimenting’ with case study research in their article, ‘An Experimental Template for Case Study Research.’<sup>53</sup> This thesis can be classified as observational research. Conducting observational research in a truly experimental way and typifying case study research methodology increases the validity of the results. Gerring and McDermott present four prototypical design methodologies for case study research: dynamic comparison, longitudinal comparison, spatial comparison, and counterfactual comparison. As illustrated in Figure 3, one can determine a study's research design by determining the temporal and spatial variations of selected cases for study.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Gerring and McDermott.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 688-693.

		<i>Spatial variation:</i>	
		Yes	No
<i>Temporal variation:</i>	Yes	1. Dynamic comparison	2. Longitudinal comparison
	No	3. Spatial comparison	4. Counterfactual comparison

Figure 4. Gerring and McDermott's Matrix of Case Study Research Design  
*Source:* John Gerring and Rose McDermott, "An Experimental Template for Case Study Research," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 3 (July 2007): 688.

This thesis displays characteristics of all these designs; however it most closely aligns with the dynamic comparison research design methodology. The dynamic comparison research design methodology is employed where spatial and temporal variations can be observed. The dynamic comparison most closely resembles a classic experiment.

This thesis retrospectively observes three cases using identical research questions. For the purpose of this thesis, these cases are equal in geopolitical respects; all are FSU countries or were directly within the USSR's sphere of influence, all are currently sovereign international states, and all are currently within USEUCOM's AOR. Therefore, these cases are relatively well-bounded and lie at the same level of analysis, which as discussed earlier, makes them valid units for case study research.

The exception to their geopolitical equality is their current relationship with the Russian Federation. This is not a random variable, however, because the Russian

Federation's relationship with the three cases studied is carefully calculated based on many factors, including the cases relationship with the United States.

The four research questions used to analyze each case are:

1. What are Russia's interests and DIME actions in the country?
2. What are the U.S.'s interests in the country?
3. How do Russian and U.S. interests in the country converge and diverge?
4. What is the impact to USEUCOM of the convergence and divergence of Russian and U.S. interests in the country?

A cross-case analysis is conducted once all of the evaluation criteria are satisfied to draw conclusions. This thesis ultimately analyzes the implications of a resurgent Russian Federation on USEUCOM activities by examining the convergence and divergence of Russian and U.S. interests in each case. USEUCOM activities are guided by US national interests.

This thesis' design methodology probably does not pass the *ceteris paribus* test.<sup>55</sup> However, by examining several cases, this thesis preserves the integrity of its findings by ~~analyzing~~ covariational patterns in a probabilistic fashion."<sup>56</sup> Applying Gerring and McDermott's design template as described will help others re-conceptualize this case-based research, improve the viability of this study, and defend its use.<sup>57</sup>

Conducting observational research along experimental lines, i.e. dynamic, longitudinal, spatial, and counterfactual comparisons, minimizes ambiguity in the

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 693.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 688.

research and leads to more valid research findings.<sup>58</sup> Typifying this study's research design, identifying its case selection technique, and applying to it a scientific design template will allow others to replicate this study and its findings. These characteristics reduce the potential for ambiguity and generalizations in this study's findings.

This study analyzes Russia's resurgence in the USEUCOM AOR by analyzing Russian and US interests and actions in the area through a multiple case study methodology using standard analysis criteria. This analysis answers the secondary research questions of: what, if any, is the impact a resurgent Russian Federation has on USEUCOM activities?; what indicators exist that demonstrate the Russian Federation is a center of influence?; what has driven the Russian Federation's successful reemergence as a center of influence; was the Russian Federation's role as a center of influence ever truly diminished?; does the Russian Federation have the power and resources to sustain itself as a center of influence?; what is the Russian Federation's sphere of influence?

Answering these secondary research questions ultimately satisfies the primary research question; Does a resurgent Russian Federation impact USEUCOM activities? These questions are analyzed in chapter 4 using the research methodology described above.

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid., 699.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

The hypothesis for this study is that the Russian Federation's resurgence impacts USEUCOM activities by forcing USEUCOM to strike a balance between cultivating Russia as a strategic partner on security cooperation issues while also preparing to defend US allies against Russian aggression.

This study tests this hypothesis by using the research methodology described in chapter 3. Specifically, this study examines the overarching U.S. interests in the USEUCOM AOR, provides an overview of Russian interests in solidifying itself as a center of influence, and analyzes a series of case studies that illuminate Russia's diverse DIME actions to consolidate its sphere of influence. Four identical areas of analysis are examined in each case study: Russian interests and DIME actions, U.S. interests, how Russian and U.S. interests converge and diverge, and how this convergence and divergence impact USEUCOM activities. Finally, a cross-case analysis is conducted to provide conclusions and recommendations, which are provided in chapter 5.

#### Overview of U.S. Interests in the USEUCOM AOR

It is not within the scope of this thesis to thoroughly analyze all U.S. national interests throughout Europe within the context of this thesis. This study focuses on studying U.S. national security interests and obligations in Europe to draw a link to the impact a resurgent Russia has on USEUCOM activities, since USEUCOM is a military organization. This thesis lies entirely on the premise that USEUCOM activities are conducted in response to and support of U.S. national security interests. It is the charge of

unified combatant commands to translate guidance received from the President and Secretary of Defense into strategic concepts or courses of action.<sup>59</sup> Joint Publication 3.0 describes the combatant commander as the “vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate [Joint Force Commanders] that conduct military operations.”<sup>60</sup> Therefore, the identification of U.S. national security interests in the USEUCOM AOR this study contributes to conclusions about the implications of a resurgent Russia on USEUCOM activities.

The *2010 National Security Strategy of the United States* outlines the enduring interests of the United States as:

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
- A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
- An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.<sup>61</sup>

The *National Security Strategy* claims weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons, as the greatest threat currently facing the American people.<sup>62</sup>

The U.S. seeks closer collaboration with European allies, as provided in the National Security Strategy; “Engagement begins with our closest friends and allies—

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<sup>59</sup>U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 3.0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006 incorporating Change 2 (Suffolk, VA: US Joint Forces Command, 22 March 2010), x

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup>*2010 U.S. National Security Strategy*, 7.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, 8.



from Europe to Asia; from North America to the Middle East. . . . America's national security depends on these vibrant alliances, and we must engage them as active partners in addressing global and regional security priorities and harnessing new opportunities to advance common interests." The *National Security Strategy* specifically mentions the United Kingdom, France, and Germany as among the closest of U.S. allies with whom the U.S. will work on issues of ~~mutual~~ and global concern."<sup>63</sup> Each of these nations falls within the USEUCOM AOR.

The U.S. asserts it is committed to acting multilaterally when use of force is necessary, and places alliances as the foundation of its regional and global security. The *National Security Strategy* specifically mentions the critical importance of the U.S.'s mutually beneficial relationship with European allies in the security arena;

Our relationship with our European allies remains the cornerstone for U.S. engagement with the world, and a catalyst for international action. We will engage with our allies bilaterally, and pursue close consultation on a broad range of security and economic issues. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the pre-eminent security alliance in the world today. . . . We are committed to ensuring that NATO is able to address the full range of 21st century challenges, while serving as a foundation of European security. And we will continue to anchor our commitment in Article V, which is fundamental to our collective security.<sup>64</sup>

The U.S. also seeks greater engagement with emergent foreign centers of influence. The *National Security Strategy* states, ~~We~~ will continue to deepen our cooperation with other 21st century centers of influence - including China, India, and Russia - on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect."<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., 42.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 11.

Successful engagement for the U.S. includes developing critical military and security partnerships. The National Security Strategy calls on the U.S. military to “continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”<sup>66</sup>

The *2010 National Security Strategy* specifically mentions U.S.-Russian relations several times with diverse tones, ranging from overtures for partnership to calls for restraint regarding Russia’s use of its military forces. This is exemplified in a paragraph dedicated specifically to Russia regarding building cooperation with other centers of influence. The U.S. states its desire to build a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia, built on economic and strategic security partnership. However, the U.S. also states that, “While actively seeking Russia’s cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors.”<sup>67</sup>

The majority of what the *National Security Strategy* presents specifically regarding Russia is optimistic in tone, and complements the U.S.’s “reset policy” with Russia. According to the reset policy, the U.S. still views Georgia as a divisive point in U.S.-Russian relations, but that it is willing to move forward on other collaborative initiatives. “Reset” calls for greater economic collaboration with Russia and expanded military-to-military partnerships.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.,44.

<sup>68</sup>The White House, U.S.-Russian Relations: “Reset” Fact Sheet, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet> (Washington, DC: The White House, 24 June 2010).

The *National Security Strategy* and other national guidance provides a wealth of information pertaining to the U.S. approach to regional and global security. Some of the highlights that are directly relevant to USEUCOM are provided above. However, it is necessary to determine how the U.S. military establishment translates this information as guidance for the Department of Defense and USEUCOM.

The *2011 National Military Strategy of the United States* reasserts the military's respect for civilian authority over the military. This strengthens the assertion that USEUCOM interests can be gleaned from national guidance, such as the National Security Strategy. The *2011 National Military Strategy* appropriately mimics the enduring national interests presented in the *National Security Strategy* and subsequently presents the national military objectives of the United States. These objectives are:

- Counter Violent Extremism
- Deter and Defeat Aggression
- Strengthen International and Regional Security
- Shape the Future Force.<sup>69</sup>

The *National Military Strategy* also echoes the importance of building security relationships and maintaining NATO as the U.S.'s "preeminent multilateral alliance" and the cornerstone of defense relations in Europe.<sup>70</sup>

The *National Military Strategy* contains information specific to the USEUCOM AOR that should be considered as strategic guidance for USEUCOM. It states;

We will actively support closer military-to-military relations between the Alliance and Europe's non-NATO nations, some of which have reliably

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<sup>69</sup>The Joint Staff, *2011 National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 8 February 2011), 4.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, 12.

contributed to trans-Atlantic security for decades. As we strengthen our European alliance, we will increase dialogue and military-to-military relations with Russia, building on our successful efforts in strategic arms reduction. We seek to cooperate with Russia on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, space, and Ballistic Missile Defense, and welcome it playing a more active role in preserving security and stability in Asia.<sup>71</sup>

The *National Security Strategy* and *National Military Strategy* outline U.S. interests in Europe and Eurasia. The information provided in these documents also forms the basis for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and Guidance for Employment of the Force, which is strategic guidance for the unified combatant commands, including USEUCOM. The question remains; how does USEUCOM interpret this information and incorporate it into the USEUCOM strategy?

One can look directly to USEUCOM for its interpretation of US national security interests. The USEUCOM website provides that, “One of U.S. European Command's priorities is to strengthen NATO's collective defense and assist its transformation. This is accomplished through our primary mission of building partner capacity to enhance transatlantic security.”<sup>72</sup>

USEUCOM and NATO are inextricably linked. The U.S. has treaty obligations to NATO, specifically under Article V of the Washington Treaty. Article V of the Washington Treaty outlines the principle of collective defense. This means that if any member of NATO is attacked, it is considered an attack on all members of NATO. The

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<sup>71</sup>Ibid., 12-13,

<sup>72</sup>USEUCOM, “EUCOM Support to NATO,” <http://www.eucom.mil/english/NATO/> (accessed 1 May 2011).

United States and Czech Republic are among NATO's member countries.<sup>73</sup> The Commander of USEUCOM is also chief of NATO's Strategic Command, Europe, and is therefore given the title Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR is responsible for developing defense plans for Europe, for determining force requirements, and for deployment and exercises of forces under his command.<sup>74</sup> SACEUR is the commander of Allied Command Operations, which is headquartered at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Allied Command Operations is responsible for all NATO military operations.<sup>75</sup>

The dual responsibilities of Commander, USEUCOM and SACEUR strengthen the assertion that support and obligations to NATO are among the U.S.'s chief interests in the USEUCOM AOR. USEUCOM commits a significant amount of resources to both strengthening NATO and engaging in partnerships for theater security cooperation. The 2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement provides dozens of examples of partnership programs and exercises with NATO and other European allies.

One cannot examine U.S. interests and US-Russian Relations in the USEUCOM AOR without exploring the Ballistic Missile Defense issue. The U.S. remains committed to building a missile defense system. The *2010 U.S. National Security Strategy* specifically states, ~~w~~e will strengthen our regional deterrence postures—for example, through phased, adaptive missile defense architectures—in order to make certain that

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<sup>73</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ~~D~~iscover NATO,” [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/what\\_is\\_nato.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/what_is_nato.htm) (accessed 3 May 2011).

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe, ~~W~~hat is Shape?,” [www.shape.nato.int](http://www.shape.nato.int) (accessed 3 May 2011).

regional adversaries gain no advantages from their acquisition of new, offensive military capabilities.”<sup>76</sup> The 2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement echoes this sentiment, and makes clear that the perceived threats against which such a missile defense shield would defend are unpredictable international actors such as Iran and Syria and non-state actors such as Hezbollah.<sup>77</sup>

The U.S. has many national security interests in the USEUCOM AOR. These national security interests are outlined in the *National Security Strategy* and *National Military Strategy*. Chief among those interests are USEUCOM’s theater security engagements with NATO and other European allies, support to economic development in Europe, and the establishment of a BMD system to defend Europe and the U.S. against state and non-state actors. These interests and their implications for USEUCOM activities are discussed further in the case studies analyzed later in this chapter.

#### Overview of Russian Interests in the USEUCOM AOR

The latest Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation was approved by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 12 July 2008. This Foreign Policy Concept provides insight to the official Russian government position on its role as a center of influence and its interests within the USEUCOM AOR. Russia views itself as a center of influence with an increasing role in international affairs.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>2010 *National Security Strategy*, 41.

<sup>77</sup>2011 *USEUCOM Posture Statement*, 44.

<sup>78</sup>Russian MFA, July 2008.

A researcher begins to understand what Russia views as its sphere of influence by examining Russia's foreign policy objectives, as provided in the Foreign Policy Concept. Russia's Foreign Policy Concept states that Russia's primary foreign policy objectives are to: ensure national security, assume its role as an influential center of the modern world, create favorable external conditions for modernizing Russia and transforming the Russian economy, strengthen the role of the UN in international affairs, promote good relations with bordering states, eliminate sources of tension and conflict in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation and other areas of the world," protect the rights of Russian citizens abroad, promote Russia's international image as a democratic nation with a free market economy, and to promote the Russian language and culture abroad.<sup>79</sup>

President Medvedev reasserted these goals and helped clarify Russia's perceived sphere of influence later in 2008 following the war with Georgia. Medvedev stated that Russia would adhere to the following five principles; that Russia would observe international law, reject the U.S.'s dominance in world affairs, seek friendly relations with other nations, defend its citizens and interests abroad, and claim a sphere of influence in the world.<sup>80</sup>

Russia is concerned with the security and well-being of Russian-speakers and compatriots living abroad. This, coupled with the objective of securing its borders and promoting stability and partnerships with bordering states, suggests that Russia sees its sphere of influence as being regional, including any country on its immediate border.

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<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

<sup>80</sup>Andrew Kramer, "Russia Claims its Sphere of Influence in the World," *The New York Times*, 1 September 2008, <http://nytimes.com/2008/09/01/world/europe/01/russia.html> (accessed 24 May 2011).

Russia is particularly interested in reinvigorating its relations with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). President Medvedev has stated that Russia's sphere of influence will include, but is not limited to, the Russian border region. He asserts<sup>81</sup> that Russia ~~has~~ regions where it has privileged interests. These are regions where countries with which we have friendly relations are located."

Russia recognizes the United Nations (UN) Security Council as the only international organization that can legitimately conduct peacekeeping and military operations. The Russian Foreign Policy Statement directly and indirectly mentions the importance and legitimacy of the UN as the only international organization with the legitimacy to intervene in States' affairs. It specifically states that ~~only~~ the UN Security Council has the authority to sanction the use of force for the purpose of coercion to peace."<sup>82</sup> This is to be expected since Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto power. In concert with promoting and retaining its international positional power, ~~Russia~~ maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to Russian borders on the whole, which violates the principle of equal security."<sup>83</sup> Russia's negative attitude towards NATO expansion and the role of NATO in international affairs complements Russia's assertion that the UN is the only international organization with the legitimate authority to intervene in other State's affairs; an assertion made several

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<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Russian MFA, July 2008.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.



times in its Foreign Policy Concept. It also makes the claim that traditional ~~“Bloc~~ approaches to international problems” are not viable against today’s transnational threats.<sup>84</sup> These assertions display a self-contradictory element of Russia’s foreign policy.

Russia is interested in strengthening the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as an instrument ~~“to~~ maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS . . . as well as ensuring capability of the CSTO Member States to take prompt and effective joint actions, and on transforming the CSTO into a central institution ensuring security in its area of responsibility.”<sup>85</sup>

Russia is also inconsistent in its view of unilateral action by one state against another. Russia’s foreign policy statement asserts that ~~“the~~ unilateral action strategy leads to destabilization of [the] international situation” and ~~“Coercive~~ measures with the use of military force in circumvention of the UN Charter and Security Council” is not a viable strategy.<sup>86</sup> However, Russia also makes clear that if its partners are ~~“un~~prepared for joint efforts, Russia, in order to protect its national interests, will have to act unilaterally but always on the basis of international law.”<sup>87</sup>

Despite its negative perception of NATO and its several inferences to the United States and NATO circumventing the UN Security Council, Russia is realistic in viewing NATO as a long-term presence in its sphere of influence and sees opportunities for partnership with United States in several areas. According to its Foreign Policy Concept;

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<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.

Russia is interested in expanding bilateral trade, economic, scientific, technological, and strategic security cooperation. Russia also indicates a desire to “transform the Russian-US relations into strategic partnership” and reach new agreements on disarmament and arms control issues.<sup>88</sup>

There are specific issues on which Russia disagrees with the U.S. and NATO. As mentioned, Russia truly sees the expansion of NATO closer to its borders as a threat against its national interests. Russia also sees unilateral attempts by the United States to build a ballistic missile defense shield, with stations located within the USEUCOM AOR, as directed against Russia and a disruption to the balance of power.

Also of great importance to Russia is the leverage it holds over Europe through the energy sector. According to USEUCOM figures, “Russia is one of the most important suppliers of crude oil and natural gas to Europe, accounting for 33 percent of oil imports and 40 percent of gas imports (87 percent for Italy; 81 percent for Spain; 61 percent for Germany; and 51 percent for France).”<sup>89</sup>

Russia portrays itself as a benevolent center of influence of, at the very least, a regional sphere of influence. The official Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation correlates with the concept of Eurasianism. Major Mariusz Nogaj of the Polish Ministry of Defense explores this concept further in a 2008 thesis written for the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Major Nogaj’s thesis emphasizes that Russia is a country pursuing a balance of power while operating with elements of “Eurasian”

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<sup>88</sup>Ibid.

<sup>89</sup>*2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement*, 47.

mentality.<sup>90</sup> In its milder form, Eurasianism simply stresses Russia's uniqueness and argues that Russia need not Westernize in order to modernize. But in its hard-line version, the movement envisions the Eurasian heartland [the territory of the former Russian empire] as the geographic launch pad for a global anti-Western movement whose goal is the ultimate expulsion of 'Atlantic' (read: 'American') influence from Eurasia."<sup>91</sup> Nogaj asserts this balance of power would include a Russian-led Pan-Eurasian bloc to balance U.S. domination.

Russia first must consolidate its influence in the near abroad to achieve its aspirations of counter-balancing the U.S. hegemon that emerged after the Cold War. Janusz Bugajski provides a more critical interpretation of Russia's foreign policy goals in *Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism*. Bugajski states that Russia's main foreign policy goal is to achieve primary influence over its near abroad by expanding foreign economic activity, creating a regional energy monopoly, maintaining influence over Russia's largest private companies, ceasing the expansion of Western influence- especially in the form of NATO, and to undercut Europe's relationship with the U.S. by increasing Russia's influence in Europe.<sup>92</sup> These goals provide more perspective on Russia's intentions than those presented in Russia's Foreign Policy Concept. Bugajski's

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<sup>90</sup>Nogaj, 36.

<sup>91</sup>Charles Clover, "Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Geopolitics," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1999), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54793/charles-clover/dreams-of-the-eurasian-heartland-the-reemergence-of-geopolitics> (accessed 25 May 2011).

<sup>92</sup>Janusz Bugajski, *Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 30.

interpretation of Russia's foreign policy goals indicate there is real cause for concern regarding the future of Russian relations with the U.S. and Europe.

Major Andrea Hlosek also conducted a case-study-based analysis to examine Russian exertion of DIME influence in its near abroad; including Georgia. Her 2006 study documents Russia's resurgence as a center of influence over many areas of its near abroad. Hlosek finds that Russia is pursuing a model of Great Power Normalization- ~~the~~ pragmatic, economic-oriented approach to projecting influence."<sup>93</sup> Through this approach Russia has successfully reasserted influence with FSU countries to achieve its foreign policy goals; demonstrated by its success in convincing Uzbekistan to evict U.S. forces from the Karshi-Kanabad airbase in 2005. Russia and Uzbekistan subsequently entered into a mutual defense pact after several years of Uzbekistan taking a decidedly pro-West stance. Hlosek's thesis demonstrates Russia had been less successful with attempts to exert influence over Georgia to reverse its pro-West stance, which led to an increasingly aggressive approach. Despite these examples, through 2006 Russia continued to successfully take a pragmatic approach with increasing economic ties with the West.<sup>94</sup>

Though researchers and scholars may disagree somewhat on Russia's ultimate foreign policy objectives and desired relationship with the West, all seem to agree that Russia aims to firmly establish a sphere of influence over its Near Abroad and counter NATO expansion. Indeed, Russia validates these assertions through its Foreign Policy Concept. Russia would prefer to do so without the use of military force, though it has demonstrated its willingness to do so through the 2008 conflict with Georgia. Russia also

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<sup>93</sup>Hlosek, 5.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

claims it wishes to expand relations with Europe and the U.S., but it seems Russia wishes to do so in a peer to peer relationship where there exists a balance of power acceptable to Russia.

### Summary of U.S. and Russian National Security Interests

The U.S. views its relationship with European allies as the lynchpin to its multilateral approach to foreign relations. The U.S. is interested in expanding its relationships and engagements with NATO and other European allies through theater security cooperation and other engagements. The U.S. invests heavily in conducting multinational exercises and training events in the USEUCOM AOR. Furthermore, the U.S. recognizes the energy dependence Europe has on foreign countries- like Russia- and hopes to limit the destabilizing effect this can have in the USEUCOM AOR. The U.S. is also committed to developing a BMD system to defend itself and European allies.

Russia has re-emerged since the fall of the USSR as a resurgent nation currently seeking to restore a balance of power within its sphere of influence over its near abroad through DIME actions and project itself as a relevant international power through mechanism like the UN Security Council, its rejection of U.S. and NATO efforts to unilaterally establish a land-based ballistic missile defense system in Europe, and the leverage it has created through the energy sector.

Both countries have indicated a desire to work more closely with one another; however differences remain. The U.S. and Russian overarching interests in the USEUCOM AOR seemingly validate the working hypothesis of this study that the Russian Federation's resurgence impacts USEUCOM activities by forcing USEUCOM to strike a balance between cultivating Russia as a strategic partner on security cooperation

issues while also preparing to defend US allies against Russian aggression. This study now examines this hypothesis by analyzing the following case studies.

### Ukraine

Ukraine is a country of about 45.7 million people located on the southwestern border of the Russian Federation. Ukraine also shares a border with Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova. It also has a substantial coastline along the Black Sea. A map of Ukraine is located in Appendix A. Seventy-eight percent of the population identify themselves as ethnic Ukrainians. Roughly seventeen percent of the population is ethnic Russian. Ukrainian and Russian are the primary languages, with 85 percent of the population claiming Ukrainian as their primary language. Ukraine has a tumultuous history, and is currently experiencing its longest run of sovereign independence.<sup>95</sup>

Ukraine declared independence from the Russian Empire in 1918 following the fall of the Romanov monarchy during the Bolshevik revolution. After three years of constant conflict, the largest portion of Ukraine was absorbed into the USSR as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Ukraine declared independence from the USSR on 24 August 1991. It has a parliamentary-presidential style government with executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup>U.S. Department of State, “Background Notes: Ukraine,” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3211.htm> (accessed 15 May 2011).

<sup>96</sup>Ibid.

## Russian Interests and DIME Actions in Ukraine

Russia has multiple national interests in the Ukraine. Major Mariusz Nogaj presented a detailed case study of Russian interests and DIME action in Ukraine in a 2008 thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School. Nogaj determined that Russia has the following foreign policy goals regarding Ukraine: (1) to keep Ukraine in the Russian zone of influence, (2) to prevent Ukraine from joining the Western political and military alliances like NATO or the EU, (3) to strengthen the Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia.<sup>97</sup> These goals are validated by Russia's Foreign Policy Concept and the DIME actions Russia has taken in Ukraine.

Several key issues help define the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine is not a member of NATO or the European Union, Ukraine is a FSU country, there is a large Russian diaspora in Ukraine, Russian troops are stationed in Ukraine, and Ukraine is almost fully dependent on Russian energy supplies.<sup>98</sup> Russia uses its full arsenal of DIME instruments of national power to project influence over Ukraine. Russia mostly applies diplomatic, information, and economic pressures to influence Ukraine. However, Russia's military does have a presence in Ukraine; a fact that cannot be ignored.

Russia has had mixed results influencing Ukraine with its diplomatic instruments of national power. Ukraine was among the founding 12 members of the CIS, though it never formally ratified the charter of the CIS. Nonetheless, the CIS has been a mechanism through which Russia has sought to strengthen relations with Ukraine and

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<sup>97</sup>Nogaj, 103.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid.

other CIS members under Russian leadership and counter pro-Western sentiments amongst CIS members.<sup>99</sup>

The 1994 presidential election in Ukraine provides an example of Russia's unsuccessful attempt to influence Ukrainian politics shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia felt the 1994 Ukrainian presidential elections would dictate the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations and Ukraine's position within the Russian sphere of influence. Russia was committed to bringing Ukraine further within the Russian sphere of influence or, at the very least, keeping the relationship as it was. Russia took an extremely active role in the campaign of pro-Russian candidate Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych; sending advisors to head the election campaign and to organize support for Yanukovych. Russian president Vladimir Putin even visited twice during the campaign to show support for Yanukovych and send the message that Russia was committed to a close relationship with Ukraine.<sup>100</sup> The initial election results were too close and forced a run-off election between Yanukovych and pro-western party candidate Victor Yushchenko. Russian advisors again took an active role in Yanukovych's campaign and also convinced losing candidates from the first round of elections to support Yanukovych. Nonetheless, pro-Western candidate Victor Yushchenko won the presidential election after the "Orange Revolution" forced a recount of the election ballots. The ultimate result of the election was a pro-Western government and a tarnished Russian image amongst the international community. Ultimately, though, the pro-West

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<sup>99</sup>Ibid, 103.

<sup>100</sup>Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, "Russia's Role in the Orange Revolution," in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Moscow, Carnegie Endowment, 2006), 146, 145-164.



sentiment would not remain as strong due in part to Russian influence. In 2010 Victor Yanukovych was elected to the presidency and has taken a much more pro-Russian stance than his predecessor.<sup>101</sup>

Russia has effectively used information to influence the population in Ukraine. Russia's ability to influence Ukrainians through information rests on the fact that the Russian language is, —widely spoken in Ukraine, so the Russian newspapers, radio and TV stations have access to the Ukrainian society. In addition to that, a huge Russian ethnic minority is concentrated in the Eastern Ukraine, especially on the Crimea Peninsula. These people openly express their sympathy to Russia, so the Russian cultural, spiritual and informational influences find a fertile ground there.”<sup>102</sup>

Russia often leverages the existence of the Russian diaspora in Ukraine to achieve its foreign policy goals in Ukraine. Russia tries to portray the Russian diaspora in Crimea as an oppressed minority. Russia began in earnest issuing Russian passports to its diaspora in Ukraine after Ukraine openly supported Georgia following the 2008 conflict with Russia. This seemingly sent a message to Ukraine, given Russia's foreign policy objective of protecting the interests of Russians abroad; much like it did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian politicians even began questioning the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine over Crimea and the Sevastopol Naval Base.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup>Department of State, Background Notes: Ukraine.

<sup>102</sup>Nogaj, 108.

<sup>103</sup>Taras Kuzio, —Russian Passports as Moscow's Geopolitical Tool,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 176 (15 September 2008), <http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=6032558&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0> (accessed 25 May 2011).

The Russian Black Sea Fleet, based at Sevastopol on Ukrainian territory, provides Russia a symbolic military instrument of national power. Russia has thousands of military personnel based at Sevastopol. This resulted from a series of three 1997 intergovernmental agreements signed between Russia and Ukraine that divided the Soviet Black Sea Fleet between the two countries and allowed Russia to lease from Ukraine the port at Sevastopol until 2017.<sup>104</sup> In May 2008, Ukraine announced it would not extend the basing rights agreements after 2017.

Russia does not currently use the Black Sea Fleet or the military personnel stationed in Ukraine as a purely military threat against Ukraine. Instead, it plays a more informational role. “The BSF [Black Sea Fleet], with bases in Sevastopol, a city symbolizing heroism and patriotism for the Russians, feeds the Ukrainians’ fear of possible separatism in Crimea. This is the reason the dispute over BSF resonates so strongly both in Moscow and Kiev.”<sup>105</sup> Russia uses its military in Ukraine more as a subtle hint to Ukraine of Russia’s military capabilities than as a military instrument of national power. Russia is also careful to strike a balance between scaring Ukraine into the arms of NATO and providing just enough tension to feed the detractors within NATO who oppose Ukraine’s accession.

The military is not Russia’s primary lever of influence in Ukraine. However, Russia has leveraged its energy influences over Ukraine to achieve its military objectives. In April 2010, the Rada ratified the Kharkiv gas-for-basing agreement in which Ukraine

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<sup>104</sup>Global Security.org, “Black Sea Fleet (BSF),” 22 April 2006, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mf-black.htm> (accessed 25 May 2011).

<sup>105</sup>Nogaj, 114.

agreed to extend the Russian Black Sea Fleet's basing rights in Sevastopol for an additional 25 years (until 2042) in exchange for concessional pricing of Ukraine's imports of Russian gas."<sup>106</sup>

Russia's dominance in the energy sector is the predominant economic instrument employed by Russia to extend influence over Ukraine and, by extension, the rest of Europe. The Kharkiv gas-for-basing agreement is just one major example of Russia using its energy dominance to influence foreign policy.

Russian state-owned gas monopoly Gazprom owns and controls the pipelines that provide natural gas from Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to Ukraine. However, all gas pipelines on Ukrainian territory are owned and operated by the state. It is these pipelines that transport Russian natural gas to the rest of Europe.<sup>107</sup> This complex relationship has created tension at least twice during the last decade.

Russia fills over 25 percent of Europe's natural gas needs. As of today, 80 percent of those natural gas supplies traverse Ukraine. It is estimated that Ukraine will continue to deliver a large portion of Russian natural gas to Europe even after new pipelines are completed that bypass Ukraine.<sup>108</sup>

Until recently, the price rates for Russian natural gas controlled by Ukrainian pipelines were renegotiated annually. Disputes over price rates led to Russia shutting off gas to Ukraine and the rest of Europe twice in the last ten years; once briefly in 2006 and

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<sup>106</sup>Department of State, Background Notes: Ukraine.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid.

<sup>108</sup>IHS Global Limited, "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Ukraine," Jane's Sentinel Country Ukraine external.htm (accessed 15 May 2011).

again for an extended period in 2009, which created crisis-level conditions in some European countries.<sup>109</sup> These actions demonstrated both the leverage Russia has over Ukraine with regard to the natural gas industry and also Europe's energy vulnerabilities to relying on Russian-supplied natural gas. The Kharkiv gas-for-basing agreement has supposedly resolved this issue for the next ten years.

Russia has several interests in Ukraine and has demonstrated its ability to leverage several DIME instruments of national power to achieve its foreign policy goals in Ukraine. Russia intends to keep Ukraine in the Russian zone of influence, prevent Ukraine from joining Western political and military alliances like NATO or the EU, and strengthen the Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia. Russia also views Ukraine as a buffer state between Russia and NATO alliance countries.<sup>110</sup> Russia employs a full range of DIME instruments to achieve its goals, however its dominance in the energy sector provides the greatest source of leverage over Ukraine.

#### U.S. Interests in Ukraine

The U.S. has taken great interest in the democratization and transition to a market-based economy of Ukraine since the dissolution of the USSR. In line with its overarching foreign policy objectives as provided in the 2010 National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy; the U.S. is pursuing closer economic relations and security cooperation with Ukraine. The U.S. Department of State proclaims that, "U.S.

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<sup>109</sup>Department of State, "Background Notes: Ukraine."

<sup>110</sup>Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Ukraine.

policy remains centered on realizing and strengthening a democratic, prosperous, and secure Ukraine more closely integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures.”<sup>111</sup>

The U.S. has put its words into action by signing trade and security agreements with Ukraine. The U.S. began providing assistance to the Ukraine and other FSU countries immediately following the dissolution of the USSR through the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act. The Freedom Support Act was enacted in October 1992 and has provided Ukraine over 4.1 billion U.S. dollars in assistance.<sup>112</sup> In 2006 the U.S. recognized Ukraine as a market economy and granted Ukraine permanent normal trade relations with the U.S. In 2008 the U.S. and Ukraine signed a Trade and Investment Cooperation Agreement that facilitates deeper bilateral trade and investment relations.<sup>113</sup> The U.S. also strongly supported Ukraine acceptance into the World Trade Organization; which eventually occurred in 2008.<sup>114</sup>

In 2008 the U.S. and Ukraine concluded the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. Among the tenets of this Charter is the closer security cooperation between the U.S. and Ukraine to strengthen Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership. The Strategic Partnership Commission was established under the Charter by Vice President

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<sup>111</sup>Department of State, Background Notes: Ukraine

<sup>112</sup>Ibid.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid.

<sup>114</sup>Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Ukraine.

Biden and President Yushchenko in 2009. This senior-level commission continued after the election of President Yanukovych; holding a meeting as recently as February 2011.<sup>115</sup>

President Yanukovych has reversed the previous administrations aspirations for NATO accession. Yanukovych has made it clear since his election that he wishes for Ukraine to have closer relations with Russia while continuing its economic cooperation with the West. Yanukovych has stated that Ukraine will not formally join any security blocs, including NATO, while he is in office.<sup>116</sup> Ukraine is a participant in NATO's partnership for peace program; a program designed to encourage military and political cooperation between NATO members and their neighbors. Yanukovych has indicated that Ukraine will decrease its participation in such activities under his administration.<sup>117</sup>

Ukraine's reversal on NATO accession may actually align with U.S. interests. President Bush strongly supported Ukraine's accession to NATO. President Obama, conversely, may not want to grant accession to Ukraine because of the "Reset" policy with Russia. Strongly pursuing Ukraine's accession to NATO may antagonize Russia and sour relations.<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, President Yanukovych has made it clear Ukraine no longer seeks accession to NATO, and 70 percent of the Ukrainian population agrees with him.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>115</sup>Department of State, Background Notes: Ukraine.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

<sup>117</sup>Jane's Sentinel: Ukraine.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid.

The U.S. has multiple interests in Ukraine. The U.S. has sought closer economic and security relations with Ukraine since the dissolution of the USSR. In concert with its overarching foreign policy in Europe, the U.S. seeks closer security engagement with Ukraine and encourages Ukrainian economic stability. The U.S. is wary of pursuing these interests too aggressively, given the reset of U.S.-Russian relations and the pro-Russian tendencies of the current Ukrainian administration.

#### How Russian and U.S. Interests in Ukraine Converge and Diverge

Analysis thus far has revealed that Russia's overarching interests in Ukraine are to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence, prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and keeping Ukraine economically dependent on Russia. The U.S.'s overarching interests are to increase security engagements with, and economic diversification in Ukraine.

Russia and the United States strongly differed in their views of Ukraine's accession to NATO. The United States strongly supported Ukraine's accession, while Russia viewed it as further encroachment in its sphere of influence by the West. The current presidential administration in Ukraine has solved this problem for both countries. While Ukraine supports a close relationship with NATO, it does not seek accession. President Yanukovich is overtly pro-Russian and is pursuing better economic and security relations with Russia.

The economic influence Russia has in Ukraine is cause for concern for the U.S. When Russia shut off gas to Ukraine over a price dispute in 2009, it put many U.S. allies in Europe in a crisis. Ukraine was able to tap into reserves for its own use; however much

of Europe went three weeks without natural gas in the middle of winter.<sup>120</sup> It has already been demonstrated that Russia used its energy influence over Ukraine to settle the gas price dispute and achieve other foreign policy goals, e.g. extending the lease at Sevastopol. This also highlights the energy influence Russia carries over the rest of Europe. This can have a destabilizing effect in Europe. Most of the U.S.'s European partners are heavily reliant on Russian crude oil and natural gas. From the U.S. perspective, "Russia's energy leverage represents a key factor in European and Eurasian energy security."<sup>121</sup>

The extension of Russian troops stationed in Crimea amongst Russian sympathizers also carries the potential for instability. This runs directly counter to the U.S. goal of providing security for U.S. allies. Russia's actions in Ukraine demonstrate that it has no intention of voluntarily relinquishing the energy influence it has over Ukraine and Europe.

Ukraine has taken an appropriately balanced approach to relations with both Russia and the West. Ukraine seems to acknowledge the DIME influences Russia has in Ukraine, but also understands the economic and security benefits of continuing to enhance ties with the West. Russia probably claims Ukraine as a diplomatic victory, as it still sees its relationship with the West as mostly a zero-sum game. It sees success in its DIME efforts to keep Ukraine firmly within its sphere of influence and slow the expansion of NATO. Ukraine's recent political leanings affirm the Russian view.

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<sup>120</sup>Department of State, Background Notes: Ukraine.

<sup>121</sup>*2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement*, 47.



## Impact to USEUCOM

USEUCOM activities in 2010 demonstrate that USEUCOM is operating in line with U.S. national security objectives, especially with regard to developing closer relationships with NATO members and allies throughout Europe. Despite Ukraine reversing its intent to become a member of NATO, USEUCOM engaged Ukraine as a security partner on several occasions, even after President Yanukovich's election. Likewise, Russia's overtly negative perception of NATO and NATO operations in its sphere of influence do not keep it from participating in partnership activities with USEUCOM.

USEUCOM approaches security engagement and military cooperation activities through a heavy emphasis on Joint exercises with NATO members and partner nations, including Ukraine and Russia. —The most intensive form of peacetime interaction with our allies and partners occurs in the conduct of joint exercises. European Command maintained a robust bilateral and multilateral exercise program last year, executing 33 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S., allied, and partner nation personnel from 40 nations.”<sup>122</sup>

The 2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement lists at least four major exercises in which Ukraine actively participated. Of note was Rapid Trident 10, which was —conducted in Ukraine to support its NATO interoperability goals through NATO's Annual National Program.”<sup>123</sup> US Army Europe, a component of USEUCOM, also

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<sup>122</sup>2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement, 5.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., 17.

included Russia in three major exercises in an observer role. USEUCOM asserts this was done ~~as~~ as part of the larger U.S. efforts to reset our relations with Russia.”<sup>124</sup>

Russia’s energy domination in Europe and Eurasia directly impacts USEUCOM activities. USEUCOM is currently formulating a way to help achieve great energy security in Europe. Admiral Stavridis delicately addressed this in the 2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement:

European Command supports State Department objectives regarding European energy security, and we work with our interagency partners, NATO allies, and partner nations to support these objectives: diversification of energy transportation routes in Europe; greater intra-Europe integration of existing supply systems; the development of new, renewable, and alternative energy sources in Eurasia; and demand-side efforts to promote energy efficiency. Within European Command, we are proposing a joint concept for energy security to achieve these same objectives, ensure access, and decrease vulnerabilities within our own forces. Our J9 Interagency Partnering Directorate continues to employ a whole-of-government approach to collaborate with our partners and like-minded allies to develop frameworks for addressing major energy security issues.<sup>125</sup>

This statement seems to impugn the reliability of the current energy transit system; i.e. the transit of Russian resources through Ukraine’s pipelines.

The 2010 Kharkiv gas-for-basing agreement in which Ukraine agreed to extend the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s basing rights in Sevastopol until 2042 also has an impact on USEUCOM activities. Long term planning now must assume a continued Russian presence in the Crimea at the Black Sea Fleet Base in Sevastopol. This presence can have a destabilizing effect if Russia chooses to increase its information operation activities amongst the Russian diaspora in eastern Ukraine. USEUCOM must consider this as a potential catalyst for conflict in a partner nation and plan accordingly.

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<sup>124</sup>Ibid.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., 48.

## Summary

Both Russia and the United States are actively pursuing foreign policy goals in Ukraine. Russia has successfully employed DIME instruments of national power to achieve its goals of keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influence, retaining energy influence over Ukraine, and countering the expansion of NATO near Russia's borders. The election of a pro-Russian administration in Ukraine has contributed significantly to Russia's success. The United States is attempting to achieve its goals of expanded security and economic ties with Ukraine. It is doing this using many tools, including USEUCOM. USEUCOM, in response to U.S. national security objectives, includes Ukraine and Russia in exercises designed to increase security cooperation. USEUCOM is also working to relinquish Europe from Russia's energy domination. This case study validates the working hypothesis of this thesis.

## Georgia

Georgia is located on the southern border of Russia. It also borders the Black Sea, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey. A map of Georgia is provided in Appendix A. Georgia is a country of 4.6 million people. Georgians make up the majority ethnic group at roughly 84 percent of the total population. The Georgian language is a distinct and ancient language. It is the official language of Georgia, and 71 percent of the population claims it as their native tongue.<sup>126</sup>

Georgia is an ancient nation that was historically a battleground between great empires fighting over its territory. Georgia's recorded history goes back 2,500 years and

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<sup>126</sup>U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Georgia," <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm> (accessed 17 May 2011).

its capital city of Tbilisi is over 1500 years old. However, Georgians have only lived as a unified country for a brief period of its history.<sup>127</sup>

Georgia became a protectorate of the Russian Empire 1783. Russia unified and annexed Georgian territory beginning in 1801. Georgia was ruled then after until 1991 from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Georgia gained independence briefly in 1918 following the Russian Revolution and established a socialist democracy. In 1921 the Bolshevik Army occupied Georgia, which was eventually absorbed into the USSR as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia in 1922. Georgia was one of the wealthiest and most privileged Soviet Republics. The Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia declared independence from the USSR in April 1991, just prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Secessionists immediately took control in areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia before cease-fire agreements were signed in the early 1990s. These conflicts remain unresolved today. The rest of Georgia stabilized in 1995 and became an active participant in the international community.<sup>128</sup>

Georgia has pro-Western leanings. It seeks full accession to NATO and the EU. Georgia has been problematic for Russia's efforts to reestablish its sphere of influence.

#### Russian Interests and DIME Actions in Georgia

Conflicts between Russia and Georgia began shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia has attempted to influence Georgia mostly through economic and

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<sup>127</sup>Ibid.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid.

military instruments of national power; however, these instruments have been complimented by or resulted in diplomatic or information effects.

Major Andrea Hlosek, USAF, used Georgia in a 2006 a case-study to support her conclusion that Russia has successfully reemerged as a strong center of influence with a sphere of influence including central Asia and the Caucasus. Hlosek contends that ~~Russia's~~ key interests in Georgia are characterized by efforts to ensure regional stability, retain military influence, protect holders of Russian passports<sup>129</sup>, and increase economic ties.”<sup>130</sup>

Major Nogaj, Polish Ministry of Defense, presented a more recent case-study of Georgia in 2008 to document Russia's DIME actions in its near abroad. Nogaj contends that ~~Russian~~ interests in Georgia, and more broadly in the Transcaucasus, are concentrated around four pillars: (1) maintaining stability in the region, (2) ensuring the Russian military presence and political dominance, (3) tightening the economic ties with Russia, (4) protecting the Russian [passport-holders] in the region.”<sup>131</sup>

Given the findings of Hlosek's and Nogaj's theses, coupled with the research conducted in this study; Russia's overarching interests in Georgia are identified as: creating stability in the Transcaucasus region, maintaining military influence, deterring NATO expansion, expanding economic ties, and protecting Russian passport-holders.

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<sup>129</sup>Many scholars, including Majors Hlosek and Nogaj, use the term ~~—diaspora~~” in their research of Russian influence. This thesis will use the term ~~Russian passport-holder-~~”or some variant thereof- instead of ~~—diaspora~~” in its research of Georgia, as it more accurately reflects the current status of South Ossetians and Abkhazians who possess Russian passports.

<sup>130</sup>Hlosek, 34.

<sup>131</sup>Nogaj, 125.

Russia's most overt methods of achieving these goals have come in the form of economic and military action.

Russia has used its DIME instruments in a highly coordinated manner to achieve its foreign policy goals in Georgia. Russia began employing DIME instruments in Georgia almost immediately following Georgia's independence from the USSR. In 1999 Russia started a much more aggressive campaign apparently aimed at punishing Georgia for its pro-West foreign policy.<sup>132</sup> This campaign became increasingly aggressive until the seemingly inevitable military confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008.

In 1999 Russia was deep in its second war against Chechen separatists and began accusing Georgia of providing throughput for Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. Russia introduced a visa requirement for all Georgians entering Russia. Roughly 500,000 Georgians were working in Russia at the time. The only exceptions were for South Ossetians and Abkhazians. Not only did this diplomatic aggressiveness have a significant impact on the Georgian economy; it also fed the separatist sentiment in the autonomous Georgian regions in northern Georgia.<sup>133</sup>

Then, in the winter of 2000, Russia shut off the natural gas supply to Georgia. Georgia was still almost entirely reliant on Russia for natural gas. This came on the heels of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in which Russia was

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<sup>132</sup>Dow Lynch, *Why Georgia Matters* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, February 2006), 45-51.

<sup>133</sup>Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Georgia. Jane's Sentinel Country Georgia external.htm (accessed 17 May 2011).

pressured into agreeing to withdraw from two military bases on Georgian soil.<sup>134</sup> This highly coordinated use of diplomatic, economic, and information instruments is a shining example Russia using DIME to assert its influence.

In 2004 it appeared Russia was beginning to succeed with respect to Georgian foreign policy. After the Rose revolution in Georgia, Georgia's president Mikhail Saakashvili made it among his top priorities to improve relations with Russia. He visited Moscow in 2004 and talks were held regarding Russian-Georgian relations and securing the international border between the two countries. Unfortunately for Russia, another of Saakashvili's priorities was to put Georgia on a firm economic path to integration with the West. As noted in Nogaj's thesis, these two priorities were mutually exclusive.<sup>135</sup>

2006 is arguably the year in which Georgian-Russian relations passed the point of no return. Russia blatantly and aggressively began employing all DIME instruments to leverage all influences available with the ultimate goal of countering the U.S.'s and NATO's influence in Georgia. In 2006 Russia closed all transportation links to Georgia in response to Georgia detaining four individuals whom it claimed were Russian spies. Also in 2006 Russia imposed a ban on all Georgian imports to Russia in response to Georgia's demands that Russia vacate its peacekeeping operations in Georgian conflict zones. This action eliminated ninety percent of Georgia's wine export. Georgia's mineral water exports and agricultural exports were also greatly reduced.<sup>136</sup> As a result, Georgia

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<sup>134</sup>Dow Lynch, *Why Georgia Matters* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, February 2006), 45-51.

<sup>135</sup>Nogaj, 134.

<sup>136</sup>Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Georgia. Jane's Sentinel Country Georgia external.htm (accessed 17 May 2011).

began looking west for economic integration and to its immediate neighbors for alternative energy sources.

2006 through 2008 marked a period in which both Russia and Georgia waged intense information campaigns against each other. The aim was to weaken the other's support and credibility in the international community.<sup>137</sup>

In 2008 Russia's willingness to conduct overt military action against Georgia was becoming clear. Early 2008 was marked by great strides by Georgia to secure accession to NATO. In January 2008 Georgia conducted a non-binding plebiscite in which seventy-seven percent of voters supported accession to NATO. Though NATO did not offer a membership action plan in return, it did guarantee Georgian accession at an unspecified future date.<sup>138</sup> Russia recognized that Georgian foreign policy was now largely oriented away from Russia and that NATO expansion was growing ever-closer to Russia's borders.

In April 2008 Russia was accused of downing of a Georgian unmanned aircraft. Russia also increased its peacekeeping force in Abkhazia and conducted large-scale exercises of its North Caucasus forces with the intent of preparing for peacekeeping operations in Georgia.<sup>139</sup>

Tensions came to a head in June 2008. Georgia launched a military assault in South Ossetia in an attempt to restore Georgian control of the area. Russia responded to Georgia's military operations in South Ossetia with what the UN described as

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<sup>137</sup>Nogaj, 134.

<sup>138</sup>Jane's Sentinel: Georgia.

<sup>139</sup>Ibid.



overwhelming force. Russia destroyed the Georgian Army in a matter of five days.<sup>140</sup>

Russia's military response seemed to be as much an attempt to achieve its own foreign policy as it was an opportunity to send a message to the West. As LTC Robert Hamilton, USA describes:

Russia chose Georgia to demonstrate its intent to return to the world stage as a major power and to dictate terms of the security architecture along its periphery. In doing so it directly challenged Western interests in Georgia and the wider Eurasian region by calling into question the security of non-Russian energy corridors to Europe, ending – at least for the time being – Georgia's contributions to coalition operations and bringing divisions within NATO over the future direction of the Alliance to the surface.<sup>141</sup>

A cease-fire agreement brokered by the French dictated both sides return to their pre-conflict positions.<sup>142</sup> Georgia responded to Russia's military action by officially cancelling all diplomatic relations with Russia and formally withdrawing from the CIS. Georgia also immediately began looking to the West for security assistance.<sup>143</sup>

Russia complied with the cease-fire parameters and withdrew from the established security zone. However, Russia immediately recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent nations. This move was followed by only three other nations.

Russia has since indicated it will station 1,700 forces in both regions and intends to establish air and naval bases in Abkhazia. In 2009 Russia secured forty-nine-year lease

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<sup>140</sup>Ibid.

<sup>141</sup>LTC Robert Hamilton, USA, "After August: Causes, Results, and Policy Implications of the Russo-Georgian War" (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. March 2009), 3.

<sup>142</sup>U.S. Department of State, "Country Background Notes: Georgia," <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm> (accessed 24 May 2011).

<sup>143</sup>Ibid.

agreements to establish bases in the two areas as part of signed defense pacts.<sup>144</sup> Russia also conducted a large scale military exercise named Caucasus 2009, seemingly as a show of force to Georgia and the West. Russia announced in 2009 that Russian border guards would patrol the borders separating Georgia from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<sup>145</sup>

Russia's activity in South Ossetia and Abkhazia continued into 2010. Russia signed a formal military pact with Abkhazia and reportedly deployed its S-300 surface-to-air missile systems in Abkhazia. The U.S. claims these actions are in direct violation of the 2008 negotiated ceasefire.<sup>146</sup>

Russia's interests regarding Georgia are creating stability in the Transcaucasus region, maintaining military influence, deterring NATO expansion, expanding economic ties, and protecting the Russian diaspora. Russia has used all DIME instruments of national power to exert influence in Georgia. Recently Russia's actions have been overwhelmingly military in nature. These actions created tension that leaves future conflict a real possibility. This tension is exacerbated by Russia's claimed rights to protect its small diaspora in Georgia. Russia arguably has lost Georgia as part of its diplomatic and economic sphere of influence and failed in its objective of creating stability in the Transcaucasus region. Georgia will likely never again view Russia as a benefactor or reliable partner. However, Russia has protected and demonstrated its military influence in Georgia. Its military actions have influenced the U.S. and NATO to reconsider granting Georgia a Membership Action Plan.

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<sup>144</sup>Jane's Sentinel: Georgia.

<sup>145</sup>Ibid.

<sup>146</sup>Department of State Country Background Note: Georgia.

## U.S. Interests in Georgia

In 2009 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hamilton, USA, conducted a detailed analysis of U.S. interests in Georgia and the policy implications of the Russo-Georgian conflict.<sup>147</sup> He determined that the U.S. regional interests are, –access to energy supplies, continuation of the security contributions and defense reform efforts of regional states, support for the political and economic transition processes underway there, and setting conditions for Russia’s own political and economic transformation.”<sup>148</sup>

The U.S. interests identified by Hamilton essential mirror the U.S. stated foreign policy goals discussed earlier, with the exception of –access to energy supplies” and –setting conditions for Russia.” Access to energy supplies is a U.S. interest in Georgia. LTC Hamilton sums up well the strategic importance of Georgia to the U.S. and the West:

As a transit country for the only route to market for Caspian hydrocarbons not controlled by Russia; as a major contributor to coalition operations, especially in Iraq, where it maintained the third largest contingent; as a much-used overflight route and refueling point for U.S. aircraft bound for Afghanistan; and as a vibrant market economy and a country imperfectly but sincerely attempting to plant democracy its rocky, post-Soviet political soil – Georgia mattered and the attention it received from the West spoke to that fact.<sup>149</sup>

U.S. security interests in Georgia can therefore be determined as; security cooperation and contributions, economic development, and access to energy supplies. The U.S. has been a leading supporter of Georgia’s diplomatic, economic, and military integration with the West since the dissolution of the USSR. The U.S. has increased

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<sup>147</sup>Hamilton, 5.

<sup>148</sup>Ibid., 3.

security engagements with Georgia and should view Georgia as a success story with regard to economic and energy diversification.

Georgia's significant contributions to coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are critically important to U.S security interests. This is one reason for the U.S.'s staunch support of Georgia's NATO aspirations before and after the Russo-Georgian conflict. The conflict forced Georgia to return home 2,000 troops who were responsible for an entire province in Iraq, creating a manpower vacuum the U.S. had to fill.<sup>150</sup> Georgia's accession to NATO might prevent future conflict between Russia and Georgia and lead to greater stability in the region.

In 2008 before the military conflict between Georgia and Russia the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passed a resolution supporting a NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia. The U.S. continued to support Georgia's accession to NATO even after the military conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008.

Additionally, it remains within the U.S.'s overall foreign policy goals to promote security partnerships with NATO members and their allies. As LTC Hamilton notes, "Not only do these efforts yield military forces that are more interoperable with Western militaries, but the process of reform itself results in defense establishments that are better-managed, that adhere to Western norms and that therefore contribute to both internal and regional stability in the countries where they are underway."<sup>151</sup>

The U.S. continued strengthening security cooperation activities with Georgia in the wake of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. Immediately following the conflict U.S.

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<sup>150</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid., 17.

Navy vessels delivered aid directly to Georgia. In 2009 the U.S. and Georgia signed the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. This charter outlines the importance of the relationship as strategic partners and U.S. support for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as the intent of both countries to enhance defense and security cooperation; to further develop economic, trade, and energy cooperation; to advance democracy; and to build people-to-people and cultural exchanges."<sup>152</sup>

The U.S. —Reset relations with Russia in June 2010. The U.S.-Russia Reset policy specifically states, —The Obama Administration continues to have serious disagreements with the Russian government over Georgia. We continue to call for Russia to end its occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in parallel have worked with the Russian government to prevent further military escalations in the region."<sup>153</sup> Though the Reset policy specifically mentions that Georgia remains a divisive point between Russia and the U.S., the desired ends of this policy have certainly forced the U.S. to give pause to aggressively pursuing Georgia's NATO aspirations.

The U.S. is actively pursuing its political and economic foreign policy goals with Georgia. The U.S. has provided Georgia over 3 billion U.S. dollars in aid since Georgia's independence from the USSR. This includes 1 billion dollars to support economic and humanitarian recovery activities following the 2008 war with Russia.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>152</sup>Department of State Background Note: Georgia.

<sup>153</sup>The White House, —U.S.-Russia Relations: \_Reset\_ Fact Sheet," <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet> (accessed May 2011).

<sup>154</sup>Department of State Country Background Note: Georgia.

Georgia provides an excellent example of a FSU country successfully re-orienting itself away from Russia's economic influence. Georgia successfully revived its economy after Russia banned imports and closed transportation links from Georgia. Georgia pursued economic agreements with its other neighbors in the region and the West. Georgia's economy grew ten and twelve percent in 2006 and 2007, respectively, before falling below seven percent growth in 2008 due to the war with Russia and the global economic crisis.<sup>155</sup> Georgia's economy shrunk another four percent in 2009 but bounced back to 6.5 percent in 2010. Additionally, the World Bank listed Georgia as the eleventh easiest place globally to do business in 2011.<sup>156</sup>

Georgia has also successfully removed itself from Russia's energy influence. Since completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline, Georgia has significantly reduced its reliance on Russian oil and gas. This is complimented by conservation efforts and hydroelectric energy production. It is noteworthy, however, that 40 percent of Georgia's electricity comes from a power plant located in Abkhazia; a disputed territory largely under Russian influence. There has never been an interruption in service from this hydroelectric plant.<sup>157</sup>

Georgia is a delicate balancing act for the U.S. Georgia actively supports the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan; providing the second most troops of any non-NATO country and critical overflight rights to extend the U.S.'s strategic reach. It has also

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<sup>155</sup>Hamilton, 19.

<sup>156</sup>Department of State Country Background Note: Georgia.

<sup>157</sup>Ibid.

supported operations in Iraq and the UN mission in Kosovo.<sup>158</sup> The U.S. and NATO have in Georgia a staunch ally making great strides toward economic and security integration with the West; however, the U.S. is cautious not to upset relations with Russia.

The U.S.'s security interests in Georgia focus on security cooperation and contributions, economic development, and access to energy supplies. The U.S. has been successful in securing these interests. The 2009 security pact signed between the U.S. and Georgia formalizes these interests. Georgia has made great progress towards security and economic integration with the West. Georgia is an excellent example of a FSU country emerging from under the economic and energy influence of Russia. Though the U.S. is committed to better relations with Russia, the U.S. has made clear in foreign policy statements such as the 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2010 U.S.-Russia Reset fact sheet that it intends to promote the territorial integrity and security of Georgia.

#### How do U.S. and Russian Interests in Georgia Converge and Diverge

Russia's overarching interests in Georgia are; creating stability in the Transcaucasus region, maintaining military influence, expanding economic ties, and protecting Russian passport-holders. The U.S.'s security interests in Georgia focus on security cooperation and contributions, economic development, and access to energy supplies.

Russian and U.S. interests diverge in almost every respect with regard to Georgia. The exception is that both countries are interested in creating stability in the Caucasus region. Yet even within this context the two countries disagree on the ends, ways and

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<sup>158</sup>Hamilton, 16.

means of achieving regional stability. Resolving the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remains the central issue. Russia recognizes them as sovereign international entities while the U.S. and almost all of the rest of the international community still view the regions as Georgian sovereign territory.

Russia has lost most of its diplomatic, economic, and information influence in Georgia. Therefore it is unlikely Russia will reverse its stance on the separatist regions since Russia likely views its influence in the regions as a means toward achieving stability in the Transcaucasus, in terms of quelling rebels and terrorists in the region. Conversely, its continued recognition of these areas and military presence in these regions against the wishes of the West creates significant tension in the area and the potential for continued conflict. Russia's military actions in Georgia have achieved one of its foreign policy goals; and that is to counter the expansion of NATO in Russia's sphere of influence. Its willingness to use military force when necessary, and its demonstrated ability to do so, have made the U.S. and NATO delay accession for Georgia and other countries.

Conversely, the U.S. is achieving most of its interests in Georgia. Georgia is on path to instituting a truly democratic government and achieving interoperability with western military forces. Georgia is providing the West with strategic reach and forces to conflict zones in the Middle East and alternatives to Russian energy dependence. Georgia's economy is also on the path to recovery. However, Russia's demonstrated willingness to resort to military conflict has stalled Georgia's accession to NATO. Nonetheless, Georgia remains a major security partner for the U.S.



The U.S. has stated numerous times that the reset policy does not include acquiescing to Russia's occupation of what the U.S. considers Georgian sovereign territory. This is implied in the 2010 National Security Strategy, which states, "While actively seeking Russia's cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors."<sup>159</sup>

### Impact to USEUCOM

USEUCOM actively engages Georgia in security cooperation engagements in support of U.S. security objectives. These engagements take many forms and serve many purposes. One of the most critical initiatives undertaken by USEUCOM is training Georgian soldiers – including two Georgian battalions in 2010- for deployment to Afghanistan. This program, known as Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force, is "an intense partnering concept with the Marines, [through which] the Georgian Armed Forces have significantly increased their institutional capacity to plan and conduct training for units preparing to operate in a full spectrum counter-insurgency environment."<sup>160</sup>

USEUCOM training for Georgian soldiers deploying to Afghanistan does have a long term affect for U.S. security interests in the USEUCOM AOR. Georgian President Saakashvili stated in 2010, "the year 2008 clearly showed the whole world that there is no 100 percent effective political deterrent. This is why we need total defense, we need

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<sup>159</sup>2010 National Security Strategy, 44.

<sup>160</sup>2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement, 19.

experience. This is why we are in Afghanistan.”<sup>161</sup> In other words; U.S. training Georgian soldiers for duty in Afghanistan, combined with the experience gained in Afghanistan, provides Georgia seasoned veterans capable of defending Georgia’s territorial integrity. Here is a clear example of Russia’s DIME actions in Georgia impacting USEUCOM activities.

There are several other examples of USEUCOM engaging Georgia in USEUCOM and NATO partnership activities. For example, under the “Eurasia Partnership Capstone” the U.S. Navy trained Georgian senior enlisted and junior officer service members on maritime interdiction operations; visit, board, search, and seizure procedures; search and rescue procedures; maritime law; and environmental protection.<sup>162</sup> There are numerous other examples of USEUCOM training Georgians to support a wide range of operations; including humanitarian assistance, medical, and peacekeeping operations.

The 2009 U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership was signed in the wake of Russia’s military defeat of Georgia and subsequent occupation of what is recognized by the U.S. as Georgian territory. Section I.1 of the Charter provides that, “Support for each other’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders constitutes the foundation of our bilateral relations.”<sup>163</sup> The Charter goes on to reaffirm NATO’s affirmation of Georgia’s eventual accession, but gives no specific timeline.

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<sup>161</sup>Jim Nichol, “Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, 23 September 2010, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-727.pdf> (accessed 17 May 2011), 4.

<sup>162</sup>Ibid., 24.

<sup>163</sup>U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership,” 9 January 2009, <http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2009/January/20090109145313eafas0.2139093.html#ixzz1Lv0SuRvS> (accessed 17 May 2011).

Section II of the Charter provides that “Deepening Georgia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions is a mutual priority, and we plan to undertake a program of enhanced security cooperation intended to increase Georgian capabilities and to strengthen Georgia’s candidacy for NATO membership.”<sup>164</sup> This enhanced security cooperation falls within the purview of USEUCOM.

One could argue that the U.S.-Russia “reset” policy significantly limits the extent to which the U.S. can engage in security assistance with Georgia without aggravating Russia. However, both the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy and the rest Policy provide that the U.S. takes exception to Russia’s current posture regarding Georgia. Therefore, Georgia remains a divisive point in U.S.-Russia relations and a potential conflict zone for USEUCOM.

If Russia postures itself for renewed military conflict against Georgia, or if U.S. security objectives dictate, USEUCOM should be prepared to continue and enhance shaping and deterrence activities. These activities would likely take the form of bilateral or multilateral exercises and other shows of support for Georgia; much like those taken by U.S. Forces Korea to deter North Korean aggression against South Korea. The U.S. must make a choice how involved it would become in a renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia. Such a conflict would become increasingly likely if Georgia succeeds in receiving a NATO Membership Action Plan. Russia might again assert its military power to counter NATO expansion in its perceived sphere of influence. USEUCOM must have contingency plans available for the defense of Georgia.

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<sup>164</sup>Ibid.

## Summary

This case study demonstrates that Russia has both succeeded and failed in its foreign policy objectives and DIME actions regarding Georgia. Russia has failed in its attempts to keep Georgia economically and diplomatically within its sphere of influence. However, because of its military actions in Georgia, Russia has succeeded for the time being in stalling NATO's expansion within its sphere of influence.

The U.S. is succeeding in its security interests regarding Georgia. These interests include security cooperation and contributions, economic development, and access to energy supplies. Another U.S. security interest is the U.S.-Russia Relations Reset. Even this policy delineates Russia's occupation of Georgian territory as a divisive point between the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. signed a strategic partnership compact with Georgia in 2009 to signal its support for Georgia.

Russia's DIME actions have implications for USEUCOM. Georgia participates in many partnership activities, including deployments to Afghanistan, in order to deter and, if necessary, defend itself against Russian aggression. It is USEUCOM forces that train the Georgian military.

Furthermore, USEUCOM must be prepared for renewed conflict in the Caucasus. The U.S. must make a choice how involved it would become in a renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia. USEUCOM must have contingency plans available for the defense of Georgia.

## Czech Republic

The Czech Republic is a country of 10.5 million people, 94 percent of whom are ethnic Czech. There is not a significant ethnic Russian population in the Czech Republic.

The Czech Republic is located in central Europe and shares international borders with Austria, Germany, Poland, and Slovakia.<sup>165</sup> A map of the Czech Republic is located in Appendix A.

In 1620 the Czechs were conquered by the Hapsburg Monarchy, which ruled the Czechs until the monarch fell at the end of World War I. Following World War I, Czechs, Slovaks, and Moravians were united into the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; also known as Czechoslovakia. In 1939 Germany invaded Czechoslovakia and declared the country a protectorate of Germany. Slovakia had already declared independence from Czechoslovakia and voluntarily became a puppet state for the Nazis; however, the country was reunified following the war.<sup>166</sup>

Troops from the Soviet Union overran Czechoslovakia in 1945 and assumed control. National elections were held in 1946. The democratic elements envisioned Czechoslovakia as a free country serving as “a bridge between East and West.”<sup>167</sup> With heavy influence from Moscow, the Communist Party eventually seized power in 1948.<sup>168</sup> On 1 May 1955 Czechoslovakia signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance; known in the West as the Warsaw Pact.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>165</sup>U.S. Department of State, “Country Background Note: Czech Republic,” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3237.htm> (accessed 25 May 2011).

<sup>166</sup>Ibid.

<sup>167</sup>Ibid.

<sup>168</sup>Ibid.

<sup>169</sup>Modern History Sourcebook, “The Warsaw Pact, 1955,” <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html> (accessed 19 May 2011).

Under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek, the communist party began implementing a major reform program in 1968 with the intent of creating a socialist democracy that would guarantee freedom of speech, religion, press, and travel, among other things. This reform program so distressed other Warsaw Pact countries that on 20 August 1968 troops from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and East Germany invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia.<sup>170</sup>

Though Czechoslovakia officially protested the occupation as against international law, no action was taken. The reformist Czech leadership was taken to the Soviet Union and forced to sign a treaty that allowed for temporary stationing of Soviet troops on Czechoslovakian soil.<sup>171</sup> The “Prague Spring” events- as they have come to be known- and the following period of “normalization” essentially ended reform movements in Czechoslovakia until the Velvet Revolution in 1989.<sup>172</sup>

1989 brought swift and sweeping change to Czechoslovakia. On 17 November 1989 a peaceful pro-democracy rally was violently dispersed by communist police. This gave rise to a peaceful, popular revolt known as the Velvet Revolution that forced the removal of communist authority by December 1989. Immediately the leaders of the Velvet Revolution were elected to power and set Czechoslovakia on the path to democratization. In 1992 Slovaks began lobbying for greater autonomy. On 1 January

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<sup>170</sup>U.S. Department of State, “Country Background Notes: Czech Republic,” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3237.htm> (accessed 19 May 2011).

<sup>171</sup>Ibid.

<sup>172</sup>Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Czech Republic, Jane’s Sentinel Country Czech extern.htm, 27 August 2010 (accessed 19 May 2011).

1993 a law went into effect creating two sovereign nations; the Czech Republic and Slovakia.<sup>173</sup>

The United States immediately recognized both countries. Today, the Czech Republic is a parliamentary republic and a member of NATO and the EU.<sup>174</sup> The president of the Czech Republic is Vaclav Klaus; elected to a five-year term in 2008.<sup>175</sup>

### Russian Interests and DIME Actions in the Czech Republic

The Czech Republic makes an interesting case study for this thesis, especially regarding Russia's resurgence and foreign policy goals. The Czech Republic is a former Warsaw Pact member and element of the Soviet bloc that is now a member of NATO. Since the Czech Republic and Russia do not share a border, and because there is not a Russian diaspora in the Czech Republic, only a couple of Russia's stated foreign policy goals could directly apply. These goals are identified as:

- To ensure national security, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve strong position of authority in the world community that best meet the interests of the Russian Federation as one of [the] influential centers of the modern world...
- To create favorable external conditions for the modernization of Russia, transformation of its economy along innovation lines, enhancement of living conditions, consolidation of society.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>173</sup>Department of State Background Note: Czech Republic (accessed 19 May 2011).

<sup>174</sup>Jane's Sentinel: Czech Republic (accessed 19 May 2011).

<sup>175</sup>Department of State Background Note: Czech Republic (accessed 24 May 2011).

<sup>176</sup>Russian MFA, July 2008.

This case study demonstrates that Russia's interests in the Czech Republic are economic growth and maintaining a nuclear balance of power with the United States.

Russia is expanding its energy influence in the Czech Republic through state-controlled and private Russian firms. Russia has established a dizzying array of seemingly private corporations that compete for business in the energy sector. Russian gas giant Gazprom, for example, allegedly owns or controls several natural gas companies in Central Europe. One of them, Vemex, now controls twelve percent of the Czech Republic's gas market.<sup>177</sup> As Gregory Feifer and Brian Whitmore point out in "Czech Power Games: How Russia is Building Influence in the Former Soviet Bloc," "Vemex is just one of a large number of enterprises Gazprom has set up in countries across Central and Eastern Europe to muscle into the European energy-utilities business. By disguising the real owners, Gazprom makes its actions more palatable to Europeans wary of expanding Russian influence."<sup>178</sup> Additionally, as of 2008, roughly seventy-seven percent of natural gas imported by the Czech Republic came from Russia.<sup>179</sup>

Aiding Russia's economic expansion in the Czech Republic are Czech officials seen as susceptible to bribes from Russian companies to secure favorable outcomes to Russian enterprise. Whitmore and Feifer contend in their article that, "rampant corruption

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<sup>177</sup>Gregory Feifer and Brian Whitmore, "Czech Power Games: How Russia is Rebuilding Influence in the Former Soviet Bloc," Radio Free Europe, [http://www.rferl.org/content/Czech\\_Mate\\_How\\_Russia\\_Is\\_Rebuilding\\_Influence\\_In\\_The\\_Former\\_Soviet\\_Bloc/2168090.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Czech_Mate_How_Russia_Is_Rebuilding_Influence_In_The_Former_Soviet_Bloc/2168090.html) September 25, 2010 (accessed 19 May 2011).

<sup>178</sup>Ibid.

<sup>179</sup>Richard J. Anderson, *Europe's Dependence on Russian Natural Gas: Perspectives and Recommendations for a Long-term Strategy*, George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies Occasional Papers, No 19, September 2008, 10.



is making Czechs vulnerable to exploitation by a resurgent Russia with ready cash to help fulfill its burning desire to reestablish its influence over former Soviet bloc countries.”<sup>180</sup>

Russia is lobbying hard within the Czech government to secure contracts with Russian state-controlled companies in the nuclear energy sector as well. The Czech state-controlled energy company CEZ runs a nuclear power reactor that provides thirty percent of the Czech Republic’s electricity; a percentage that is growing.<sup>181</sup> Now, CEZ is soliciting offers for the biggest contract in Czech history; an expansion of the nuclear reactor located an hour south of Prague in the village of Temlin. CEZ considers the nuclear plant as a key element of the Czech Republic’s energy independence. The contract is due to be awarded in 2012 and the new reactors are planned to be operational by 2020.<sup>182</sup> Among the three companies that CEZ has allowed to bid on the project is Atomstroieksport, a Russian government-controlled company. The other two companies are American and French corporations. Whitmore and Feifer claim Atomstroieksport is the top contender at this point.<sup>183</sup> This comes on the heels of CEZ replacing Westinghouse- an American company- last year as the provider of nuclear fuel to the Temlin plant with a Russian government-controlled company.<sup>184</sup> This infiltration of the Czech energy sector by Russian companies could lead to greater Russian influence in Czech politics and even greater energy influence than it already enjoys.

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<sup>180</sup>Feifer and Whitmore.

<sup>181</sup>Ibid.

<sup>182</sup>Jane’s Sentinel: Czech Republic.

<sup>183</sup>Feifer and Whitmore.

<sup>184</sup>Ibid.

This fear is supported by an open letter written to President Obama in 2009 from influential leaders from Central and Eastern Europe; including former heads of state, defense ministers, and foreign ministry chiefs regarding the potential for the slipping of relations between the U.S. and its allies in East and Central Europe.<sup>185</sup> One could pass off Whitmore and Feifer's article as speculative conspiracy theory until reading the open letter to President Obama.

This letter paints a picture of Central and East Europe as increasingly slipping from U.S. and NATO attention and influence. This is essentially being caused by a lack of attention by the U.S. and NATO, while Russia is slowly expanding its leverage in the former Soviet Bloc through economic and diplomatic channels. This is only exacerbated by a recent downward trend in American popularity in many East and Central European countries.<sup>186</sup> Indeed, the signatories state, "NATO today seems weaker than when we joined. In many of our countries it is perceived as less and less relevant - and we feel it. Although we are full members, people question whether NATO would be willing and able to come to our defense in some future crises."<sup>187</sup> The letter takes a markedly cautionary tone specifically regarding Russia:

And then there is the issue of how to deal with Russia. Our hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that Moscow would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-

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<sup>185</sup>Valdas Adamkus, et al, "An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15 July 2009, [http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6825987,An\\_Open\\_Letter\\_to\\_the\\_Obama\\_Administration\\_from\\_Central.html](http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html) (accessed May 2011).

<sup>186</sup>Ibid.

<sup>187</sup>Ibid.

century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods. At a global level, Russia has become, on most issues, a status-quo power. But at a regional level and vis-a-vis our nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one. It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences. It asserts a privileged position in determining our security choices. It uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>188</sup>

The signatories of the open letter to President Obama are extremely concerned with Russia's resurgent influence and the current direction of U.S. and NATO relations with Central and East Asia. The signatories fear that their countries- including the Czech Republic- will become slowly neutralized if nothing is done to counter Russia's resurgent influence. They call for a "renaissance of NATO" and rethinking of the NATO-Russia council, among other measures, to reinvigorate the security of Central and East Europe against increasing Russian influence.<sup>189</sup>

If Russia successfully gains a large share of control over the Czech energy sector, it could lead to greater influence to sway a NATO member country toward Russia's sphere of influence. All this while several influential people believe NATO is weakening in Central and East Europe. This could have a huge impact on NATO- and therefore USEUCOM- security cooperation activities within the former Soviet bloc.

In addition to Russia's economic interests in the Czech Republic, it is also demonstrating its ability to militarily influence U.S. and NATO activities in the region. Moves to stop U.S. plans to use the Czech Republic as a radar station for BMD demonstrate Russia's interest in maintaining a nuclear balance of power with the U.S.

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<sup>188</sup>Ibid.

<sup>189</sup>Ibid.

Former U.S. President George Bush approved a plan to install a missile defense shield over Europe. Part of this plan included installing an X-band radar system in the Czech Republic as part of the BMD system.<sup>190</sup> This plan was approved by the Czech senate. Though the U.S. tried to persuade Russia that its missile defense shield is not aimed at- or capable of- repelling Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles, Russia remained unconvinced. Russia feels that the U.S.-led development of a European missile defense shield is ultimately aimed at neutralizing Russia's nuclear force and strategic deterrent. In 2007 former Russian President Vladimir Putin told the Munich security conference, "Today this system is ineffective but we do not know exactly whether it will one day be effective. But in theory it is being created for that purpose. So hypothetically we recognise that when this moment arrives, the possible threat from our nuclear forces will be completely neutralized. . . . The balance of powers will be absolutely destroyed and one of the parties will benefit from the feeling of complete security."<sup>191</sup>

Russia characterized the planned BMD system as a direct threat to its national security. In 2008, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev announced Russia would deploy Iskander short range ballistic missiles to its enclave of Kaliningrad, "to neutralize, if necessary, the anti-ballistic missile system in Europe."<sup>192</sup> Iskander missiles carry a range

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<sup>190</sup>Craig Whitlock, "Russia, U.S. warm up on missile defense," *The Washington Post*, 21 March 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-ua-warm-up-on-missile-defense> (accessed March 2011).

<sup>191</sup>Richard Weitz, "Elusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO, and Missile Defence," *Survival*, 52: 4, 99-120, 104.

<sup>192</sup>Global Security.org, "9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone)," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ss-26.htm> (accessed 20 May 2011).

of 500km, which would bring the Czech Republic within range.<sup>193</sup> Medvedev described several measures Russia would take if the U.S. continued as planned to develop a missile shield in Europe:

Therefore I will now announce some of the measures that will be taken. In particular measures to effectively counter the persistent and consistent attempts of the current American administration to install new elements of a global missile defence system in Europe. For example, we had planned to decommission three missile regiments of a missile division deployed in Kozelsk from combat readiness and to disband the division by 2010. I have decided to abstain from these plans. Nothing will disband. Moreover, we will deploy the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad Region to be able, if necessary, to neutralise the missile defence system. Naturally, we envisage using the resources of the Russian Navy for these purposes as well. And finally, electronic jamming of the new installations of the U.S. missile defence system will be carried out from the territory of the same westernmost region, that is from Kaliningrad.<sup>194</sup>

This aggressive response by Russia achieved its intended effect. In 2009 the Obama Administration shelved plans for a ground-based missile defense shield with stations in Central Europe, including the Czech Republic, as part of the U.S.-Russia Reset policy. Instead, the U.S. is pursuing a sea-based approach that is more palatable to Russia.<sup>195</sup>

This episode demonstrates the influence the Russian military still carries with the U.S. and NATO in the USEUCOM AOR. However, the U.S. maintains that it will not allow Russia to interfere with the eventual development of a European missile defense

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<sup>193</sup>Ibid.

<sup>194</sup>Ibid.

<sup>195</sup>Whitlock.

shield. It was announced in 2010 that the Czech Republic may host an early warning facility for a future U.S.-led missile defense shield.<sup>196</sup>

This examination of Russian interests and DIME actions in the Czech Republic demonstrates that Russia's interests in the Czech Republic are economic expansion and maintaining a nuclear balance of power with the U.S. Furthermore, Russia has indeed employed DIME instruments in the Czech Republic to achieve these interests.

#### U.S. National Security Interests in the Czech Republic

As previously mentioned in this chapter, chief among U.S. security interests in the USEUCOM AOR are USEUCOM's theater security engagements with NATO and other European allies, support to economic development in Europe, and the establishment of a BMD system to defend Europe and the U.S. against state and non-state actors. All of these interests apply to the Czech Republic, as the Czech Republic is a member of NATO and considered to be a premier location for elements of a European missile defense shield. Additionally, the Czech Republic provides support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Czech Republic has also proven to be an issue in the successful "reset" of U.S.-Russian relations, which is among U.S. security objectives in the USEUCOM AOR.

According to the U.S. Department of State, "Relations between the U.S. and the Czech Republic are excellent and reflect the common approach both have to the many challenges facing the world at present. The U.S. looks to the Czech Republic as a partner

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<sup>196</sup>Jane's Sentinel: Czech Republic.

in issues ranging from Afghanistan to the Balkans, and seeks opportunities to continue to deepen this relationship.”<sup>197</sup>

The U.S. and NATO began courting the Czech Republic and other former Soviet bloc countries after the collapse of the USSR. In 1994 the Czech Republic became a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program and in 1999 gained full accession to NATO.<sup>198</sup> Between 1999 and 2004 the Czech Republic successfully reformed their military into a fully professional service consisting of 30,000 personnel. The Czech Republic now trains its troops for integration with NATO rather than for territorial defense.<sup>199</sup> Czech forces specialize in —anti-nuclear, -bacteriological, and – chemical (NBC) warfare and military health care” and rely on other NATO members for other specialties.<sup>200</sup> In August 2005 the Czech Republic assumed command of the Kosovo Multinational Brigade Center; the first of new NATO members to command a deployed NATO force. As of 2010, there were 500 Czech soldiers participating in the International Security Force in Afghanistan.<sup>201</sup> The Czech Republic has been an active component in NATO, and therefore a key security interest to the United States.

The U.S. has shown signs of its interests in the economic sphere as well; specifically regarding helping Europe achieve great energy independence. In 2009 after the Temlin nuclear plant project was announced, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden made an

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<sup>197</sup>Department of State Background Note: Czech Republic.

<sup>198</sup>Jane's Sentinel: Czech Republic.

<sup>199</sup>Ibid.

<sup>200</sup>Ibid.

<sup>201</sup>Ibid.

official visit to the Czech Republic. Among his objectives was to gain favor for Westinghouse to win the multi-billion dollar contract and to help avert a Russian company from winning the contract.<sup>202</sup>

The U.S.'s interest in establishing a BMD system to defend Europe and the U.S. against state and non-state actors has been the most publicized of U.S. interests in the Czech Republic lately. As part of the original Bush plan for a missile defense shield in Europe, Czech soil was to be used for placement of an advanced radar tracking system. This is because, "Technical analysis shows that Poland and the Czech Republic are the optimal locations for fielding U.S. missile defense assets in Europe. It provides defensive coverage for the majority of Europe from longer-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. And it provides redundant coverage for the US against ICBMs launched from the Middle East."<sup>203</sup>

The U.S.'s proposed missile defense shield with stations located in Central Europe led to the worst recent souring of relations between the U.S. and Russia. Russia was so convinced that the missile defense shield was actually meant to neutralize Russian nuclear deterrent that it threatened the deployment of its Iskander short range ballistic missiles to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad; among other actions.<sup>204</sup> In 2009 as part its U.S.-Russia Relations Reset policy, the Obama Administration announced major changes to the proposed missile defense shield in Europe. Obama's new plan called for sea-based

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<sup>202</sup>Feifer and Whitmore.

<sup>203</sup>Global Security.org, "Brdy, Czech Republic," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/facility/brdy.htm> (accessed 20 May 2011).

<sup>204</sup>Jane's Sentinel: Czech Republic.



anti-ballistic missile radars and interceptors aboard Navy ships in the Mediterranean Sea. The Kremlin views this as a more acceptable plan.<sup>205</sup>

The U.S. has demonstrated through its actions that its major security interests in the Czech Republic include; theater security engagements with NATO and other European allies, support to economic development in Europe, the establishment of a BMD system to defend Europe and the U.S. against state and non-state actors, support to operations in Afghanistan, and improving relations with the United States.

#### How U.S. and Russian Interests in the Czech Republic Converge and Diverge

Russian interests in the Czech Republic are identified as economic growth and maintaining a nuclear balance of power with the United States. U.S. interests in the Czech Republic are strengthening NATO security cooperation activities, maintaining support for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, countering ballistic missile threats to the U.S. and Europe, expanding economic growth, and improving U.S.-Russian relations.

U.S. and Russian interests diverge on economic activities in the Czech Republic. The U.S. is encouraging European countries, including the Czech Republic, to attain greater energy independence. Conversely, the Russian Federation is trying to gain influence throughout the former Soviet bloc- including the Czech Republic- by increasing and leveraging their energy dependence on Russia.

The area in which the interests of the U.S. and Russia diverge the greatest is ballistic missile defense. The U.S. is intent on developing a ballistic missile defense shield to protect the U.S. and its European allies from ballistic missiles originating in

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<sup>205</sup>Whitlock.

North Korea, Iran, and the greater Middles East. Russia views any land-based elements of a U.S. or NATO BMD system in the Czech Republic as an expansion of NATO in former Soviet bloc territories and therefore against their national security interests.<sup>206</sup>

As mentioned earlier in this case study, the U.S.'s original plan for a BMD system included a ground-based X-band radar in the Czech Republic. The arrangements for this plan were bilaterally concluded between the U.S. and the Czech Republic and Poland, respectively. Poland was to be the site for the counter-missile batteries. Initially Russia feared the U.S. BMD system would neutralize its nuclear deterrence capabilities. Analysts believe that over time, however, the Russians came to understand the threat emanating from Iran and other rogue states. Russia began soliciting and entertaining the idea of a joint Russia-NATO or Russia-U.S. BMD system to protect all of Europe and Russia.<sup>207</sup>

A joint BMD system with Russia is problematic for several reasons from a U.S or NATO perspective. Relying on Russian capabilities would give Russia a veto on operations and could delay timely and effective use of the system. There is also a counter-intelligence problem with sharing sensitive technology and data with the Russians. Sharing information on capabilities between the Russia and NATO would also amount to sharing vulnerabilities with a potential adversary.<sup>208</sup>

For these reasons, among others, a truly joint Russian-US system is not likely. The U.S. has offered the development of a "fusion center" where information can be

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<sup>206</sup>Weitz, 105.

<sup>207</sup>Ibid., 99-120.

<sup>208</sup>Ibid, 109-110.

relayed from one country to the other to alleviate Russian fear that the BMD system is directed at neutralizing Russia's nuclear deterrence. The U.S. and NATO have made clear, though, that they will not allow Russia a position to influence operations of a BMD system meant to protect NATO countries.<sup>209</sup> Furthermore, it was revealed in 2010 that the Czech Republic might yet be included in plans for a ballistic missile shield; this time as the site for an early warning system.<sup>210</sup> For now, though, the Obama administration is committed to the Reset policy with Russia. It seems that if the U.S. and NATO are ever to build a missile defense shield with sites located in the former Soviet bloc- without including Russia in its operation; they will have to do so against Russian interests and risk facing potential backlash from Russia.

#### Impact to USEUCOM

The USEUCOM vision statement provides, ~~“We~~ “We strive to be an agile security organization able to conduct full spectrum activities as part of whole of government solutions to secure enduring stability in Europe and Eurasia... We are responsible for U.S. military relations with NATO and 51 countries on two continents with a total population of close to one billion people.”<sup>211</sup> The 2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement mentions the Czech Republic specifically only twice; once as a participant in an air force exercise and once as a training partner with special operators deploying to Afghanistan. However, USEUCOM's vision statement and inextricable link with NATO- as described

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<sup>209</sup>Whitlock.

<sup>210</sup>Jane's Sentinel: Czech Republic.

<sup>211</sup>*2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement*, 2.

previously- provides valuable insight to USEUCOM's commitments to the Czech Republic.

Russia's economic expansion in the Czech Republic potentially impacts USEUCOM. If Russia successfully expands its diplomatic influence in the Czech Republic by using its expanded energy influence; it could sway the Czech Republic at least back to a more centrist position in East-West relations. Having this influence over a NATO member could have serious implications on the rest of the NATO bloc, especially regarding expansionist activities in the former Soviet bloc and security cooperation activities.

Already the Czech Republic has a Russian-leaning president in Vaclav Klaus, who seeks closer ties between the Czech Republic and Russia.<sup>212</sup> This- coupled with growing concerns that the U.S. and NATO have essentially forgotten about the Czech Republic and other Central and East European partners-<sup>213</sup> could lead to deteriorating security relations between NATO and these countries.

USEUCOM must take an active role as part of a whole-of-government approach to counter the resurgent influence Moscow is gaining in the Czech Republic. The tools required for such a task are already taking shape. As mentioned in the USEUCOM posture statement, "To further embrace a 'whole of society' approach to the security environment, the Command is expanding its J9 directorate to focus on interagency

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<sup>212</sup>Feifer and Whitmore.

<sup>213</sup>Valdas Adamkus et al., 15 July 2009.

partnering and the use of whole of government/society solutions to strategic challenges.”<sup>214</sup>

USEUCOM should leverage its team of U.S. governmental organizations represented in the J9 directorate to express to the Czech Republic through security and information activities that the U.S. and NATO remain steadfastly committed to Czech Republic’s security and economic freedom. The Czechs must be reminded by USEUCOM that NATO is aware and committed to the territorial defense of the Czech Republic.

The BMD issue has a more direct impact on USEUCOM activities. The BMD issue has proven its potential to sour U.S.-Russian relations. Russia already has demonstrated its willingness to deploy severe counter measures- ranging from ballistic missile deployments aimed at Europe to electronic jamming of U.S. and NATO equipment- in response to installing BMD systems close to Russia’s borders. These reactions amount to a direct military threat to U.S. assets and NATO European allies. USEUCOM cannot take these threats lightly, given Russia’s demonstrated willingness and ability to conduct military operations in its sphere of influence against NATO partner countries.

If the Czech Republic is chosen to host an early warning system for a NATO missile defense shield that excludes Russia; Russia will again view this as an expansion of NATO activities in its sphere of influence. USEUCOM must be prepared for a Russian reaction similar to 2008. USEUCOM acknowledges it is ~~in~~creasing emphasis on

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<sup>214</sup>*USEUCOM Posture Statement*, 10

emerging mission sets such as ballistic missile defense.”<sup>215</sup> This emphasis must include contingencies for Russian countermeasures if Russia is not included as a missile defense partner.

Given Russia’s resurgent influence in the Czech Republic, and the growing perception that NATO-Czech relations are slipping; USEUCOM must send a message to Russia and the Czech Republic by pursuing closer security relationships and engagements with its allies in central and Eastern Europe. Closer military-to-military engagements with the Czech Republic both support U.S. interests in the region, as well as signal to the Czech Republic NATO’s commitment to its freedom and sovereignty.

However, USEUCOM must strike a balance between reinforcing relations with the Czech Republic and continuing to groom Russia as a potential partner. This necessity promotes stability in the region and meets U.S. national objectives for improved U.S.-Russia relations. Already the U.S. is increasing its military-to-military engagement with Russia through a series of naval and command-post exercises and high-level exchanges. USEUCOM has even signaled its readiness to include Russia in BMD activities at the appropriate time.<sup>216</sup>

### Summary

The U.S. and Russia both have interests in the Czech Republic. Russian interests include economic growth and maintaining a nuclear balance of power with the United States. U.S. interests include; strengthening NATO security cooperation activities,

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<sup>215</sup>Ibid.

<sup>216</sup>*USEUCOM Posture Statement.*

maintaining support for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, countering ballistic missile threats to the U.S. and Europe, expanding economic growth, and improving U.S.-Russian relations. Russia has employed several DIME instruments in the Czech Republic and is demonstrating its resurgent influence in the country. This plays on fears of those who believe the U.S. and NATO no longer take great interest in the security of the Czech Republic.

U.S. and Russian interests diverge in several areas; notably Russia's growing energy influence and the U.S.'s proposed BMD site in the Czech Republic. This divergence of interests means USEUCOM must strike a balance between bolstering security engagements with the Czech Republic to counter Russian aggression and increasing partnerships with Russia to support the improvement of U.S.-Russia relations.

Both countries are experiencing mixed results in achieving their interests in the Czech Republic. While Russia is gaining economic expansion in the Czech Republic and successfully convinced the U.S. and NATO to scrap plans for the X-band radar in the Czech Republic; it has not been completely successful in deterring the U.S. to build a BMD system elsewhere. The U.S. maintains a solid security relationship with the Czech Republic; however, it has failed in its attempts to use the Czech Republic as a key component of its proposed BMD system. Additionally, the U.S.'s willingness to assuage Russia's concerns signals that its Reset policy is succeeding.

This case study supports the working hypothesis of this thesis that the Russia's resurgence impacts USEUCOM activities by forcing USEUCOM to strike a balance between cultivating Russia as a strategic partner on security cooperation issues and preparing to defend US allies against Russian aggression.

### Cross-Case Analysis

This study analyzed three countries representing an accurate cross-section of the FSU and former Soviet bloc in the USEUCOM AOR in order to determine if Russia is truly resurgent; and if so, what implications that has for USEUCOM. This study found that U.S. and Russian security interests remain generally consistent across all the cases studied. The U.S.'s interests include; enhancing security engagements with NATO and other European allies, supporting economic development in Europe, establishing a BMD system to defend Europe and the U.S. against state and non-state actors, maintaining support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and successfully improving U.S.-Russian relations. Russian interests include; ceasing NATO expansion in the former Soviet bloc, expanding economic and energy activities, and maintaining a nuclear deterrent and balance of power with the U.S.

Stephen Blank asserts that the U.S. is on the losing end of its U.S.-Russia Relations Reset policy. In exchange for improved relations with Russia, the U.S. is acquiescing to Russia's expanding influence. Blank assesses that the U.S. is grossly misunderstanding Russia's intent. —A reset that omits to understand Russia's primary regional security goals and unyielding perception of a hostile U.S. that must be permanently threatened in order to have a d'étente does not augur well for this policy . . . once again we are failing to take Moscow and its interests seriously or understand with what or whom we are dealing.”<sup>217</sup>

This supports the underlying trend identified in each of the cases examined in this study that Russia feels encroached by an expanding NATO. It is willing to use military

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<sup>217</sup>Blank, 360.



posturing to counter NATO's expansion. The U.S. has demonstrated its unwillingness to respond militarily to Russian military action against non-NATO countries.

Russia's resurgence as a center of influence is actually presented as a U.S. interest in the 2010 National Security Strategy; so long as Russia is not overly aggressive in flexing its influence (e.g. invasion of Georgia). Russia's interests and actions have demonstrated, however, that allowing Russia greater influence in the region will result in diminished U.S. and NATO influence in the region. However, diplomatic, economic, and security relations between the U.S. and Russia have improved since Russian president Medvedev took office and President Obama's reset policy was issued, which is among the U.S.'s primary security interests

It seems that if the Obama administration is truly interested in Russia, as an emerging center of influence, taking greater responsibility for regional matters- as provided in the 2010 National Security Strategy- the U.S. must acquiesce to Russian influence in all DIME aspects. This will lead to growing tension in the USEUCOM AOR, especially within former Soviet bloc. Countries in the former Soviet bloc that are now NATO members, e.g. the Czech Republic, will increasingly look to NATO- and therefore USEUCOM- for military and economic assurances.

This presents a challenging scenario for USEUCOM. It must both groom Russia as a strategic partner while preparing to defend U.S. allies against Russian aggression. Given these case studies; it may only be ordered to military support its NATO allies- in accordance with Article V of the Washington Treaty- in the event of armed conflict with Russia. USEUCOM should therefore focus theater-wide on shaping and deterrence

activities; and focus phase II and III (seize initiative and dominate) activities to defending NATO members in its AOR.

These case studies demonstrate that Russia is a truly resurgent power seeking to demarcate its sphere of influence throughout the CIS and former Soviet bloc. It is employing the DIME instruments at its disposal to do so; mostly its economic and energy leverage and military capabilities. It appears willing to directly affect its interests in non-NATO countries and indirectly in NATO countries. As much as the U.S. would like to develop Russia as a strategic partner; and as much as both nations wish to see stability in the region, it must be understood that Russia feels directly threatened by the expansion of NATO and U.S. interests on its periphery.

Russia draws its strength from its nuclear deterrent and energy leverage. It still views the U.S. and NATO through an adversarial lens on several issues. This divergence of ways and means of achieving regional stability forces the U.S. to prepare for Russian aggression. This means that USEUCOM, responsible for such planning, must continue to develop Russia as a partner- in accordance with national guidance- while preparing to defend NATO allies against Russia's actions to solidify its sphere of influence.

Russia's interests in securing its sphere of influence are not altogether altruistic. As Blank points out, ~~it~~ is clear that Russia's demands center around establishing its sphere of influence and weakening U.S. power in key areas . . . Moscow insists on the primacy of its interests and the pursuit of those goals at U.S. expense, even as it seeks partnership and technological transfer."<sup>218</sup>

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<sup>218</sup>Blank, 360.

Russia has employed DIME elements in all the countries studied to achieve its foreign policy goals. Russia's foreign policy goals in the USEUCOM AOR are consistent within each of the cases studied. What differ are the prevailing DIME instruments used and the aggressiveness with which Russia uses them. Geopolitics drive the instruments and aggressiveness Russia employs. For example, Russia seems more willing to directly apply military pressure only to non-NATO member FSU countries. Additionally, Russia employs strong information campaigns where there exists a significant Russian diaspora, e.g. Ukraine, or population of Russian passport-holders. What remains wholly consistent is Russia's energy weapon. It is poised to use its energy influence in each of the cases studied.

The case studies conducted in this thesis demonstrate that both the U.S. and Russia are experiencing mixed results in achieving their interests in the region. Russia has seen success in countering NATO expansion and expanding its economic influence. However, it is not increasing its influence or leverage in all targeted areas. The U.S. seems wholly committed to pursuing national security interests in the USEUCOM AOR in accordance with the Reset policy. This is forcing the U.S. to acquiesce to expanding Russian influence in some areas. The U.S. has stated it wishes Russia to assume more responsibility as a center of influence. However, the U.S. only seems willing to allow Russia to do so if it meets U.S. strategic intent. Admiral Stavridis seemingly concurs with this assessment, and with the hypothesis of this study, when he wrote:

The complexities of establishing and maintaining a military-to-military relationship with Russia are many. On one hand, there are many areas of potential cooperation and partnership. . . . On the other hand, some of our allies and friends in the region remain concerned about Russian actions, including the conflict in Georgia in the summer of 2008. . . . Working with Russia is about balance and

seeking to find the potential for cooperation, while maintaining an open and honest dialogue about all aspects of our relationship, including where we disagree.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>219</sup>*2011 USEUCOM Posture Statement*, 38-39.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

The assigning of Russia to USEUCOM in 2002 gave USEUCOM a great deal of responsibility. Many USEUCOM partners and NATO allies have recent memories of Soviet rule over their countries. The U.S. has worked to expand democratization and security relations throughout the former Soviet bloc. Simultaneously, the U.S. is striving for closer and more cooperative relations with Russia. Perhaps in no other AOR do national strategic interests and objectives have a greater impact on a combatant commander as they do at USEUCOM.

The author of this thesis initially took an optimistic stance on the future of U.S.-Russian relations. While economic, diplomatic, and some security relations may continue to improve; the outlook for achieving the security interests of both countries in the USEUCOM AOR proves more pessimistic. This study still supports the hypothesis that the Russian Federation's resurgence impacts USEUCOM activities by forcing USEUCOM to strike a balance between cultivating Russia as a strategic partner on security cooperation issues and preparing to defend US allies against Russian aggression.

This thesis used a case-study based research methodology to ultimately answer the primary and secondary research questions posed by this study. Though the findings in this thesis are sound, they are based on three case studies. The author determined through the course of this research that more case studies, specifically of NATO-member-countries, are required to enhance the findings of this thesis regarding the implications a

resurgent Russia has on USEUCOM. Answers to the primary and secondary research questions of this study are provided below.

Does a resurgent Russian Federation  
impact USEUCOM activity?

Russia's resurgence does, in fact, impact USEUCOM activity. This is based on the fact that Russia falls within the USEUCOM AOR, and it is the role of the combatant commander to fulfill the security interests of the United States within its AOR. Russia's resurgence is directly and indirectly affecting U.S. allies and security interests in the USEUCOM AOR.

What, if any, is the impact a resurgent Russian Federation  
has on USEUCOM activities?

USEUCOM must balance its readiness to counter Russian aggression in its AOR with demonstrating its commitment to U.S. and NATO interests of improving relations with Russia. USEUCOM and NATO already include Russia in their theater security cooperation activities; e.g. naval and command post exercises and the NATO-Russia Council. The Commander, USEUCOM must continue his diplomacy activities, such as visiting Russian naval bases, to demonstrate the friendly intentions of the United States and NATO toward Russia. As provided in the *2011 National Military Strategy*, "As we strengthen our European alliance, we will increase dialogue and military-to-military relations with Russia, building on our successful efforts in strategic arms reduction. We seek to cooperate with Russia on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, space, and Ballistic Missile Defense." However, as demonstrated throughout this thesis, Russia's intentions and interests often diverge from those of the U.S., NATO, and NATO partner

countries. Therefore, USEUCOM must prepare to defend, militarily if necessary, U.S. interests in the USEUCOM AOR.

What indicators exist that demonstrates the Russian Federation is a center of influence?

Russia is successfully able to leverage DIME instruments of national power to achieve its national interests in a distinct sphere of influence. Its diplomatic and information influence, military might, and economic leverage throughout its near abroad are demonstrated in this thesis. This meets the author's definition of a sphere of influence, which is; a geopolitical entity that dominates political and economic influence within a geographic area or amongst multiple geopolitical entities comprising a sphere of influence.

What drove the Russia's successful reemergence as a center of influence?

This study has documented the diplomatic, information, military, and economic influence Russia has in diverse areas of the USEUCOM AOR. This influence has increased as the value of natural resources provided by Russia has increased. Russia is extremely reliant on its natural resource exports to sustain its economy and influence.<sup>220</sup> That said, Russia has the world's largest proven natural gas deposits, second largest coal reserves, and eighth largest proven oil reserves.<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>220</sup>Mankoff, 7 September 2010.

<sup>221</sup>US Energy Information Administration, "Russia," <http://www.eia.doe.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=RS> (accessed 24 May 2011).

Was the Russian Federation's role as a center of influence ever truly diminished?

Russia's role as a center of influence was truly diminished immediately following the fall of communism and the dissolution of the USSR. As identified in this study; this diminished influence was witnessed by NATO's successful expansion in FSU countries, including those on Russia's immediate borders. Conversely, the halting of NATO expansion by Russian DIME actions in Russia's near abroad equally signals the resurgence of Russia as a center of influence.

Does the Russia have the power and resources to sustain itself as a center of influence?

If Russian President Medvedev and his successors are successful in diversifying the Russian economy away from its reliance on natural resource exports then Russia will maintain its position as a center of influence. Nonetheless, Russia has significant proven oil and gas reserves. As long as it successfully maintains and diversifies its energy leverage (as it is attempting with the nuclear power industry) in its near abroad, it will have the resources to maintain itself as a center of influence.

What is the Russian Federation's sphere of influence?

Russia's current sphere of influence is at least regional; encompassing its border areas and parts of Central and East Europe. Additionally, this thesis has documented that Russia is again successfully using its DIME instruments to influence policy making on a global scale; including policy making in the U.S. and Western Europe.



### Recommendations

1. USEUCOM must continue on its path of engaging partner nations in its AOR- including Russia- in security engagements to demonstrate to the leaders and people of those nations that the U.S. is committed to a mutually beneficial security relationship.

2. USEUCOM should continue developing Russia as a partner, while enhancing security relationships with NATO allies and partners in Central and East Europe to diminish fears of rising Russian influence in relatively new democratic nations.

3. USEUCOM should include in any contingency plans the possibility of short-duration conflicts with Russia, focusing on defending against Russian attempts to establish de-facto control of territory on Russia's immediate border.

4. More study should be done regarding Russian DIME actions against former Soviet bloc nations that are now NATO members, especially in the Baltics. Since Russia will likely be deterred from engaging militarily against NATO-member countries, it is important to understand the DIME instruments of power Russia is employing in NATO member countries to expand its sphere of influence. This will enable USEUCOM to understand Russia's interests and actions in the USEUCOM AOR.

## GLOSSARY

Center of Influence: A geopolitical entity that dominates political and economic influence within a geographic area or amongst multiple geopolitical entities comprising a sphere of influence (author's definition).

Commonwealth of Independent States: —An association of former Soviet republics that was established in December 1991 by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to help ease the dissolution of the Soviet Union and coordinate interrepublican affairs. Other members include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.”<sup>222</sup>

Unified Combatant Command: —A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”<sup>223</sup>

USEUCOM: A Unified Combatant Command created in 1952 to provide unified command and authority over all US military forces in Europe. USEUCOM's area of responsibility includes 51 countries, including many FSU countries.

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<sup>222</sup>American Heritage Dictionary, —Commonwealth of Independent States,” <http://www.answers.com/topic/commonwealth-of-independent-states> (accessed 24 May 2011).

<sup>223</sup>The Joint Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 5715.01B, *Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 11 July 2008).

# APPENDIX A

## MAPS OF CASE STUDY COUNTRIES



Figure 5. Map of Ukraine

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “World Factbook,” [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate\\_up.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_up.html) (accessed 24 May 2011).



Figure 6. Map of Georgia

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate\\_gg.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_gg.html) (accessed 24 May 2011).



Figure 7. Map of Czech Republic

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook," [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate\\_ez.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_ez.html) (accessed 24 May 2011)

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